Montana Law Review
Volume 69
Issue 2 Summer 2008

Article 1

7-2008

Effect in Montana of Community-Source Property Acquired in
Another State (and It's Impact on Montana Marriage, Dissolution,
Estate Planning, Property Transfers, and Probate
Charles W. Willey
University of Montana School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr
Part of the Family Law Commons

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Charles W. Willey, Effect in Montana of Community-Source Property Acquired in Another State (and It's
Impact on Montana Marriage, Dissolution, Estate Planning, Property Transfers, and Probate, 69 Mont. L.
Rev. 313 (2008).
Available at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol69/iss2/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks at University of Montana. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Montana Law Review by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks at University of Montana.
For more information, please contact scholarworks@mso.umt.edu.

Willey: Community-Source Property

ARTICLES

EFFECT IN MONTANA OF COMMUNITY-SOURCE
PROPERTY ACQUIRED IN ANOTHER STATE
(AND ITS IMPACT ON A MONTANA MARRIAGE
DISSOLUTION, ESTATE PLANNING,
PROPERTY TRANSFERS, AND PROBATE)
Charles W. Willey*

I.

II.

INTRODUCTION ...........................................
ORIGINS OF THE COMMUNITY PROPERTY SYSTEM AND
STATES IN WHICH IT Now EXISTS ......................

314

321
A . O rigins .......................................... 321
B. Adoption of the Community Property System by
323
the American States .............................
III. CHARACTERISTICS OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY AND How
AND WHEN IT

IV.

Is

ACQUIRED ............................

325

A. Basic Characteristics............................
B. The Effects of Time and Method of Acquisition ..

325
327

THE IMPORTANCE OF COMMUNITY-SOURCE PROPERTY
IN M ONTANA .........................................

329

A. Montana Statutes Concerning Spouses' Rights in
Non-Community-Source Property ................ 329
B. Impact of the Uniform Disposition of Community
Property Rights at Death Act .................... 330
C. Additional Special Rules and Practices That
Govern CaliforniaProperty (Community and
338
Separate) ........................................
* Member of the State Bars of Montana and California. Adjunct Professor, The University of
Montana School of Law. This article is adapted from the author's course lectures, continuing legal
education seminars, and accompanying written materials on the treatment of community-source property
in common law states. Special thanks to Robin Turner for her dedicated research and editing assistance.
Copyright © 2006, 2007, 2008 Charles W. Willey.

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 2008

1

Montana Law Review, Vol. 69 [2008], Iss. 2, Art. 1

MONTANA LAW REVIEW

314
V.

Vol. 69

PROPERTY ACQUIRED IN MONTANA WITH COMMUNITY-

SOURCE PROPERTY REMAINS COMMUNITY PROPERTY,
EVEN THOUGH NOT HELD OF RECORD AS SUCH .......

351
A. ConstitutionalLaw Cases ........................
351
B. Non-Constitutional State Cases Confirming That
Community Property CharacterIs Not Lost When
Spouses Move Property to a Common Law State . 355
VI.

APPLICATION OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY LAW TO

NONTRADITIONAL RELATIONSHIPS .....................

A. CaliforniaDomestic Partnerships................
B. Washington Law: Property Acquired by
Unmarried Persons Treated as Community
Property upon Termination of Relationship ......
C. ConstitutionalIssues in Nontraditional
Relationships ....................................

VII.
VIII.

PREMARITAL AGREEMENTS ...............................
CONCLUSION .........................................

I.

357
357
358
360
365
366

INTRODUCTION

When a domiciliary of Montana has an interest in real or personal property that was community property in the domiciliary's
former state of residence, that property continues as community
property in Montana. This is because: (1) the community property
interest is a constitutionally protected, vested interest in the state
of original acquisition;1 and (2) under Montana law it is presumed
to continue to be community property at the time of the Montana
2
domiciliary's death, and thus presumptively vested at that time.
Under case law from most other jurisdictions (there is no such
case law in Montana), the change of domicile to Montana is not a
divesting event. Thus, the property being vested both at the time
of original acquisition and at death, it must also be vested during
the Montana domiciliary's lifetime. In other words, the move does
not change the character of the property.
This doctrine applies not only to property that was community property at acquisition, but to any subsequently acquired
property that can be traced back to the original community property. Thus, the doctrine also applies to property acquired from
sale proceeds of the original property, property acquired using the
"rents, issues, or income" of the original community property, and
1. Infra pt. III.B.1.
2. Infra pt. IV.B.
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property acquired through an exchange of the original community
3
property.
This concept is critical in Montana even though Montana is
otherwise a separate property state.4 The doctrine affects the following main areas:
1) The interests of both spouses in such community-source
property upon marriage dissolution in Montana. California case
law holds that a community property interest is a vested property
interest that cannot be divested without due process of law. 5
2) Montana estate planning and practice. Under community
property law, each spouse has the absolute right to dispose of his
or her one-half community property interest by will or by trust,
without any joinder by the other spouse. 6 Hence upon the death of
the first spouse, only the decedent's one-half of the community
property is subject to federal estate tax. 7 Further, if the first
spouse to die has not executed a will or trust disposing of his or
her one-half interest, that decedent's one-half interest passes by
intestate succession to the surviving spouse.8
3) New income tax basis in the entire community property
upon the first death; second basis adjustment on survivor's death.
Under present federal tax law, community property has a unique
tax characteristic not applicable to other property. The death of a
spouse terminates the community character of property, and the
survivor's interest then becomes her or his separately owned property. 9 Upon the death of the first spouse to die, the whole property
gets a new step-up or step-down in income tax basis, equal to the
date-of-death value. 10 If the estate qualifies for an "alternate valuation date" under Internal Revenue Code § 2032 and the personal representative so elects, then the step-up or step-down is to
the value of the property on that alternate date.1 1 When the sur3. Mont. Code Ann. § 72-9-102 (2007).
4. Id. at § 40-2-202 (speaking in terms of "individual" property).
5. In re Marriageof Heikes, 899 P.2d 1349, 1358 (Cal. 1995).
6. Gerald B. Treacy, Tax Management: Estates, Gifts and Trusts Portfolios: Community Property: General Considerations,vol. 802-2d, A-18 (Tax Mgt. Inc. 2005).
7. Id.
8. Mont. Code Ann. § 72-2-111.
9. Robert L. Mennell & Thomas M. Boykoff, Community Property in a Nutshell 5 (2d
ed., West 1988); William A. Reppy, Jr. & Cynthia A. Samuel, Community Property in the
United States 19-1, 19-5 (Lupus Publications, Ltd. 1997); Treacy, supra n. 6 at A-9; Cal.
Fam. Code Ann. 88 297.5, 770 (West 2004 & Supp. 2008); Mont. Code Ann. § 40-2-202.
10. Treacy, supra n. 6, at A-15 to A-16 (internal citations omitted); 26 U.S.C.
§ 1014(b)(6) (2000).
11. Federal Tax Coordinator2d vol. 22A, %R-5000 to R-5002 (Thomson 2008).
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vivor dies, her or his property qualifies for a second step-up or
12
step-down in income tax basis.
This basis step-up is an extremely valuable benefit for highly
appreciated property. The effect of this rule is to avoid, upon a
sale by the survivor of her one-half interest, any capital gains tax
on any appreciation which has occurred between the date of acquisition of the property and the date of death of the first spouse to
die.
Under present law, the step-up in income tax basis of the survivor's half interest occurs so long as the decedent's half interest is
includible in the deceased spouse's estate. 13 This is true "even
though an estate tax return for the decedent's estate was not re4
quired or, if required, no estate tax was payable."'
A thirty-nine-year-old Revenue Ruling ruled that a surviving
spouse was not entitled to a step-up in basis with respect to property derived from a community property source because it had
been reinvested in a non-community state and title there taken as
tenants in common. The ruling also determined that for estate tax
purposes, the property was still considered community property. 1 5
A later Ruling indicated that that earlier 1968 result was determined by state law, which did not recognize the property as
community property in the second state. In that Ruling, the
spouses were residents of a community property state.' 6 They
used community funds to purchase real property in a non-community state, taking title as joint tenants with right of survivorship.
Under the laws of the community property state there involved,
the parties had demonstrated their intention to preserve the community character of the property by an express statement in their
wills. The Internal Revenue Service stated that, in the earlier
Rev. Rul. 68-80,
the controlling factor was the state law determination that the property did not constitute community property. See Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78 (1940) (local law creates legal rights and interests; federal law determines the federal tax treatment thereof).
In the present situation, under the laws of X, the property remained community property. Even though the property was held in
joint tenancy, a common law estate, the clear intention of D and S,
12. 26 U.S.C. § 1014 (2000); 26 C.F.R. §§ 1.1014-1(a), 1.1014-2(a), 1.1014-4(a)(1) (2007).

13. 26 U.S.C. § 1014(b)(6).
14. 26 C.F.R. § 1.1014-2(a)(5); Federal Tax Coordinator2d vol. 21,
2008).
15. Rev. Rul. 68-80, 1968-1 C.B. 348.
16. Rev. Rul. 87-98, 1987-2 C.B. 207.
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as expressed in their joint wills, prevented its transmutation to separate property. Because it is community property under state law, it
is also community property within the meaning of section 1014(b)(6).
Therefore, S's interest in one-half of the property receives a
[stepped-up] fair market value basis under section 1014(a)....
If property held in a common law estate is community property
under state law, it is community property for purposes of section
1014(b)(6) of the Code, regardless of the form in which title was
taken. 17

This result is consistent with the constitutional cases cited in part
V.A. of this article.
The Ninth Circuit agrees with the underlying principle. In
Ricards v. U.S.,18 the spouses moved from California to Oregon,
where they used California-source community property funds to
buy real property, taking title to the Oregon property as tenants
by the entirety. Oregon is a common law state. 19 Upon the husband's death, the surviving spouse attempted a "double-dip" for
tax purposes. The estate tax return reported only the deceased
husband's one-half interest in the property because the other half
interest in the property had been purchased with her share of the
California community property. The IRS did not contest that.
However, the return also claimed a marital deduction for the onehalf interest that had been purchased with the deceased husband's share of the California sale proceeds. 20 The court stated,
"[ciommunity property is not eligible for the marital deduction
under [I.R.C.] § 2056."21 Carrying water on both shoulders, the
widow claimed that the decedent's one-half interest had been "converted" to separate property by the Oregon property law. The
Ninth Circuit gave her argument short shrift, saying:
The district court held that the estate was not entitled to claim the
marital deduction under § 2056. The court reasoned that Mr. Ricards' half interest in the Oregon property, even though his separate property under Oregon law, retained its characteras community property for purposes of § 2056, and was therefore ineligible for
that the court's concluthe marital deduction. Because we conclude
22
sion was correct, we affirm its judgment.

Depending on whether and how Congress acts, this basis
step-up rule may not survive after 2009 under the Economic
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id. (emphasis added).
Ricards v. U.S., 683 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1981).
Id. at 1220.
Id. at 1220-21.
Id. at 1222.
Id. at 1221 (emphasis added).
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Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA), 23
which prescribes a modified carry-over basis system for decedents
who die after 2009.24 EGTRRA's modified carry-over basis rules
are very detailed but, in general, provide for a step-up (or stepdown) in the basis of property acquired from a decedent dying after December 31, 2009, to the lesser of (1) the decedent's adjusted
basis; or (2) the fair market value of the property on the date of
25
the decedent's death.
The increase in basis is limited to an "aggregate" $1,300,000
for property transferred to non-spouse persons and $4,300,000
($1,300,000 plus $3,000,000) for property transferred to a
spouse. 2 6 It is believed that absent further Congressional action,
this modified carry-over basis regimen will apply for only one
year-in effect, to decedents dying in calendar year 2010, because
27
of the EGTRRA "sunset" provisions.
The "sunset" provisions contained in section 901 of the EGTRRA enactment are not a model of clarity. The Conference Agreement on the "sunset" provision says that the provisions of the Act
"do not apply to estates of decedents dying, gifts made, or generation skipping transfers [made] after December 31, 2010."28 The
"sunset" provisions make no specific reference to what happens
after "sunset" to the income tax rules on basis for property acquired from a decedent. It is the author's understanding that the
modified carry-over basis rules contained in I.R.C. § 1022 were an
eleventh-hour addition to EGTRRA, which seemingly explains the
ambiguity in the "sunset" provision. However, the estate tax provisions of EGTRRA are repealed with respect to decedents dying
after the end of 2010, and if Congress does not act before then, the
law as it previously existed in 2001 (before enactment of EGTRRA) is resuscitated. Thus if Congress does not act, the Applicable Exclusion Amount for estate taxes would revert to $1,000,000
after 2010. It therefore seems logical that the full step-up (or stepdown) in basis would also be restored at the end of 2010. This
interpretation is consistent with the general statement in the
23. 26 U.S.C. § 1022 (2001).
24. Treacy, supra n. 6, at A-15.
25. 26 U.S.C. § 1022(a)(2)(A), (B) (2000).
26. Id. at §§ 1022(b)(2)(B), 1022(c)(2)(B).
27. J. Martin Burke, Michael K. Friel & Elaine Hightower Gagliardi, Modern Estate
Planning vol. 2, §§ 28.23, 35.02(i) (2d ed., LexisNexis 2007); Federal Tax Coordinator2d
P-4060 (Thomson 2008).
vol. 21,
28. Pub. L. No. 107-84, 115 Stat. 252 (2001).
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"sunset" clause that the Act "shall not apply.., to... years beginning after December 31, 2010."29
It seems likely that Congress will make some sort of change in
that law before the end of 2009, since EGTRRA also includes a
temporary repeal (in 2010) of the estate tax, 30 but one can only
speculate as to what the change will be. Some commentators believe that Congress will wait until the eleventh hour to make a
change, so its members can continue to receive financial contributions from both supporters and opponents of any particular pro3
posed change. '
It has also been widely speculated that the Applicable Exclusion Amount for estate tax purposes (below which no federal estate tax return is required to be filed) will be set in the range of
$3,000,000 to $5,000,000.32 However, in light of the present budgetary shortfalls and the mammoth cost of the Iraq war, it seems
unlikely that an Exclusion Amount in the upper part of that range
will be enacted.
The Congressional Research Service's recent projection of estate and gift tax revenues anticipated that the number of federal
estate tax returns filed for 2007 will drop because of the increase
in the Applicable Exclusion Amount for 2006-2008 to
$2,000,000. 33 However, the same projection noted that the stability of revenues that have been received, despite previous dramatic
drops in the number of taxable estates, is attributable to the increase in taxes collected from the highest-income class, those with
34
gross estates of $20,000,000 or more.
As of April 1, 2008, there were no bills pending in Congress
that would affect the Applicable Exclusion Amount. However,
three bills pending in Congress as of November 2007, none of
which has been enacted, proposed setting the Applicable Exclusion Amount in the $3,000,000 to $3,500,000 range. 35 In response
to a query by U.S. Senator Jon Kyl of Arizona, Montana's U.S.
29. Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115 Stat. 38.
30. Burke, Friel & Gagliardi, supra n. 27, at § 28.23.
31. Roy M. Adams, Teleconference, Recent Developments in Estate Planning(Missoula,
Mont., Mar. 11, 2008).
32. Id.
33. Nonna A. Noto, Estate and Gift Taxes: Past and Projected in 2008 10 (Cong. Res.
Svc. Rpts. Mar. 19, 2008).
34. Id.
35. H.R. 4042, 110th Cong. § 2(c) (Nov. 1, 2007); H.R. 4172, 110th Cong. § 2(a) (Nov. 14,
2007); H.R. 4242, 110th Cong. § 3(a) (Nov. 15, 2007); H.R. 4235, 110th Cong. § 4(a) (Nov.
15, 2007).
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Senator Max Baucus stated that the Senate Finance Committee,
of which he is Chair, would hold a hearing on the estate tax issue
in 2007, with the goal of considering legislation in the early part of
2008.36

4) Transfers of Montana property (real or personal) that had
its source in a community property jurisdiction. The character of
the property as community property does not change for federal
tax purposes, in the absence of a contrary agreement, merely because the spouses move to a common law (non-community) state.
Community property law governs the interests of a husband and
wife in property acquired during marriage in a community property
state. A knowledge of community property law is important even in
common law property states, because community property retains
its community character regardless of removal to a common law
property jurisdiction. 3 7 Even when community property is exchanged for other property in a common law property state, the respective interests of husband and wife are protected. 38 State comin property for
munity property law governs the rights of spouses
39
purposes of federal income, gift, and estate taxes.
The doctrine that preserves the community property character of assets transferred to and retitled in a common law state also
affects transfers of Montana property (both real and personal)
that had its source in a community property jurisdiction. If the
spouses move from a community property state to Montana, the
benefits of community property may be most clearly preserved by
having the spouses enter into a "Community Property Agreement." Such agreements are frequently done in California. 40 By
such an agreement, the spouses can properly reflect their intention that property held in some other form of title, outside of the
community property state, is still to remain community property.
36. Office of U.S. Senator Jon Kyl, Press Release, Senate Finance Committee Chairman
Commits to Moving Death Tax Relief Legislation Forward (Cong. News Releases Oct. 4,
2007) (available at http://kyl.senate.gov/record.cfm?id=285096).
37. Treacy, supra n. 6, at A-3 (citing Doss v. Campbell, 19 Ala. 590, 590 (1851); Rozan v.
Rozan, 317 P.2d 11, 17 (Cal. 1957); Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 260 (1971));
see also infra pt. V (concerning the effect of a spouse moving to a non-community property
state like Montana).
38. Treacy, supra n. 6, at A-3 (citing Rozan, 317 P.2d at 17).
39. Id. at A-3 (citing Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101, 116, 118 (1930) (applying Washington law); Massaglia v. Commr., 286 F.2d 258, 260 (10th Cir. 1961) (applying New Mexico
law); Bishop v. Commr., 152 F.2d 389, 391 (9th Cir. 1945) (applying California law)).
40. Reppy & Samuel, supra n. 9, at 3-1; Cal. Fain. Code Ann. § 1500 et seq. and § 1600
et. seq. (West 2004 & Supp. 2008); Cal. Civ. Code Ann. § 4800(a) (West 1983 & Supp. 1984);
11 Witkin, Summary of CaliforniaLaw §§ 24 et. seq. (10th ed., Witkin Leg. Inst. 2005) and
supplement § 168B (9th ed. 1990).
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The property is still community property without such an agreement. The agreement simply obviates tracing and proof issues.
5) Montana probatepractice. If property is community property, upon the death of the first spouse to die, only his one-half
interest is subject to probate. 4 1 The surviving spouse's one-half
interest is subject to probate upon her death, if she has not given
it away before her death. 42 If the parties have put their entire
respective interests into a trust that is funded during lifetime,
43
then neither half interest need be probated.
6) Malpractice. One pair of commentators on community
property law have suggested that a lawyer working in a common
law state who fails to recognize and preserve his or her client's
community property may run afoul of applicable professional conduct rules (and thus be subject to discipline) and may also be com44
mitting malpractice.
This article uses California law for the characteristics of community property, because its law provided the prototype for all
community property states other than Texas and Louisiana.
There are, however, material differences in the details of community property in the various states that have adopted the system,
so a Montana practitioner who is dealing with a community property interest must consult the law of the state in which the community property was originally acquired. The Montana Uniform
Act that creates the presumption of continuing community property interests refers only to "community property" generically and
makes no attempt to determine which state's community property
law applies, 4 5 so the lawyer must do that.
II.

ORIGINS OF THE COMMUNITY PROPERTY SYSTEM AND
STATES IN WHICH IT

A.

Now ExISTS

Origins

The community property system was brought to Spain by the
Visigoths. The Visigoths, along with their counterpart, the Os41. Treacy, supra n. 6, at A-18; Cal. Prob. Code Ann. § 100(a) (West 2002 & Supp.
2008); Mont. Code Ann. § 72-9-107 (2007).
42. Treacy, supra n. 6, at A-18.
43. Drafting CaliforniaRevocable Trusts vol. 1, § 1.7, 7 (Marc M. Stern ed., 4th ed.,
CEB Oct. 2007); John R. Cohan & Geraldine S. Hemmerling, Inter Vivos Trusts § 2.12, 88
(Shepard's Citations, Inc. 1975); Cal. Prob. Code §§ 100, 104 (West 2002 & Supp. 2008);
Cal. Prob. Code § 5000 (West 1991 & Supp. 2008).
44. Mennell & Boykoff, supra n. 9, at 406 (emphasis added).
45. Infra pt. IV.
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trogoths, made up the Goths, a large East Germanic tribe. These
tribes were part of a force that brought down the Western Roman
Empire. 46 After this victory, the Visigoths added their influence
to early western European history. The community property system first appeared in written form in a Code (the Fuero Juzgo)
enacted by the Visigoth society in 693 A.D., 47 more than two centuries before the Magna Carta, when the common law first began
to coalesce. 48 This system now exists in Spain, Portugal, and
France. 49 Spain brought the system to the New World and colonized all of Latin America, except Brazil. 50 Brazil was originally a
Portuguese colony, and Portuguese law brought the system
there.5 1 At present, Cuba and all of the major countries of Latin
America, excluding Honduras, utilize the community property
system. 5 2 The Scandinavian countries also have a form of community property, but it does not exactly coincide with the Spanish
model. One commentator states:
At the present day, in Denmark and Norway, a community of goods
obtains unless the parties by agreement or contract otherwise stipulate. In Sweden, however, the tendency seems to give each spouse
independent control of the property of that spouse owned at the
time of marriage or acquired thereafter but with a special legal
share
right in the property of the other which permits of a half
53
therein upon termination or dissolution of the marriage.

However, the historic European model of community property
differed in one major respect from present American community
property law, in that the older European law typically gave sole
management rights to the husband. As one pair of commentators
stated:
However enlightened the community property system may have
been historically in contrast to the feudal system of coverture, in
modern times, until the reform of male-management rules, the community property system perpetuated the idea of male-dominance in
46. William Q. de Funiak & Michael J. Vaughn, Principles of Community Property
17-18 (U. of Ariz. Press 1971).
47. Mennell & Boykoff, supra n. 9, at 11.
48. de Funiak & Vaughn, supra n. 46, at 3-4.
49. Id. at 20.
50. Reppy & Samuel, supra n. 9, at 1-3 (quoting Michael J. Vaughn, The Policy of Community Property and Inter-Spousal Transactions, 19 Baylor L. Rev. 20, 35 (1967)).
51. 15 The New EncyclopediaBritannica 201-02 (Encyclopmdia Britannica, Inc. 2007)
52. Martindale-Hubbell International Law Digest (LexisNexis 2006). Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil and Chile speak in terms of "marriage partnership." El Salvador and Mexico
have an optional community property system, and Paraguay and Uruguay have an "optout" community property system. See also Quintanav. Quintana,195 So. 2d 577, 578 (Fla.
3d Dist. App. 1967) (regarding community property in Cuba).
53. de Funiak & Vaughn, supra n. 46, at 35.
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the marriage more than the common law, which at least gave [the
Wife] the right to control her own earnings .... That male-management [system] has vanished from American community property
systems 54

B. Adoption of the Community Property System by the
American States
All of the states that border Mexico (Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, and California) are community property states.5 5 So is Louisiana, which adopted the system from the then-Code Napoleon
56
when it was a French colony.
Texas is the oldest western community property state. 5 7 Its
system was originally adopted in California, from whence it
spread to all of the other present community property states.5 8
However, Texas subsequently adopted a constitutional provision
that now governs community property in that state. 59 Nevada,
Idaho, and Washington also adopted the community property sys60
tem, based primarily on the California example, many years ago.
In 1984, Wisconsin adopted the community property system
when it adopted the Uniform Marital Property Act. 6 1 Wisconsin
uses the terms "marital property" and "individual property" instead of "community property" and "separate property." However,
the difference is one of labels, not of substance. 6 2 The Wisconsin
Act itself declares that marital property is a form of community
63
property.
Alaska adopted a Community Property Act effective May 23,
1998.64 However, the Alaska system is elective, rather than
mandatory as it is in all of the other states. 65 Puerto Rico, which
54. Reppy & Samuel, supra n. 9, at 1-8.
55. Id. at 1-1 (quoting Vaughn, supra n. 50, at 20).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. (citing Vaughn, supra n. 50, at 21).
59. Id. (citing Vaughn, supra n. 50, at 20).
60. Reppy & Samuel, supra n. 9, at 1-1 (citing Vaughn, supra n. 50, at 21).
61. Id. at 1-9 to 1-10.
62. Id. at 1-10.
63. Wis. Stat. § 766.001(2) (2005-2006).
64. Treacy, supra n. 6, at A-11; Alaska Stat. ch. 34.77 (Lexis 2008).
65. Alaska Stat. § 34.77.030 (the Alaska Community Property Act, providing that except as otherwise provided in that Act, "property of spouses is community property ... only
to the extent provided in a community property agreement or a community property
trust").
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occupies the unique status of a "commonwealth" of the U.S., also
66
follows community property law, pursuant to its Civil Codes.
Since California's community property system provided the
prototype for all of the other community property laws in the U.S.
except Texas and Louisiana, 67 the examples given herein will be
based on California law. One must remember, however, that
while it is persuasive, California law does not govern community
property in the other states which now have the system.
Prior to 1939, spouses in a community property state equally
owned the earnings of one spouse, so each could file a separate
income tax return. 68 This resulted in lower tax brackets because
spouses could divide their earnings equally. However, in a separate property state, the earning spouse (typically the husband)
resulting in
had to report all of the earnings on his own return,
69
those earnings being taxed in a higher bracket.
In an effort to allow their residents to split income for tax purposes, several states tested the water by temporarily enacting
community property laws. These states included Oklahoma, Oregon, Hawaii (then a territory), Michigan, Nebraska, and Penn70
sylvania.
However, in 1948, Congress enacted a tax law that removed
7 1 It subsethis advantage to the community property states.
quently allowed a husband and wife to file separate income tax
returns ("married, filing separately"), irrespective of whether they
lived in a community property state or not. 72 Following these enactments, the community property laws were repealed in Hawaii,
Michigan, Oklahoma, Oregon, and Nebraska. 73 The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court had already struck down its community property
law as unconstitutional. 74 Currently, the states shaded on the

66. de Funiak & Vaughn, supra n. 46, at 88-89.
67. Reppy & Samuel, supra n. 9, at 1-1 (quoting Vaughn, supra n. 50, at 20). In earlier
years, the California statutes on community property were mainly in the Civil Code. Those
statutes have now been transferred to the Family Code and have been renumbered.
68. Commn. of Internal Rev. v. Harmon, 139 F.2d 211, 216 (10th Cir. 1943); de Funiak
& Vaughn, supra n. 46, at 89 (internal citations omitted).
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

de Funiak & Vaughn, supra n. 46, at 89-90.
Id. at 89 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 91.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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map provided at Figure I utilize the community property sys75
tem.
Figure I-U.S. Community Property States

III.

CHARACTERISTICS OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY AND

How
A.

AND WHEN IT

Is

ACQUIRED

Basic Characteristics

In community property states, community property must be
distinguished from the concept of "separate property." Except for
California's domestic partnership law and the recent California
decision validating same-sex marriages, both discussed in part VI
below, community property can exist only between a husband and
wife, 7 6 whereas separate property may be individually owned by
each of the spouses without any interest therein being vested in
77
the other spouse.
75. Most of this map was originally published by Mennell & Boykoff, supra n. 9, at 2.
However, at the time this map was originally published, Alaska had not yet adopted its
elective community property system.
76. de Funiak & Vaughn, supra n. 46, at 1.
77. Id. at 2; infra pt. TV.C. (discussing circumstances under which spouses own separate property).
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Under the community property system, each of the spouses
has an interest in the community property. 78 That interest is (1)
presently existing; (2) equal; (3) undivided; (4) considered vested
at the time of original acquisition; and (5) generally subject to
joint management. 79 In 1927, California briefly synopsized this
concept with legislation that expressly provided that the respective interests of husband and wife in the community during the
80
marriage are "present, existing and equal interests."
"The principle which lies at the foundation of the whole community property system is that whatever is acquired by the joint
efforts of the husband and wife shall be their common [community] property."8 1 The legal theory is that the marriage, "in respect to property acquired during its existence, is a community of
which each spouse is a member. '8 2 Because each spouse equally
contributes to its prosperity by his or her industry, each possesses
an equal right to succeed to the property after its dissolution, if
did not
one spouse survived the other and the deceased spouse
83
dispose of his or her one-half share by will or trust.
The common law system, on the other hand,
suspend[ed] the wife's legal existence during the marriage, or at
least consolidate[d] it into that of the husband. It assume[d] that
she was incompetent, and that the husband must act in the capacity

of a guardian. "During the marriage, she is nothing and has noththe old common law system] is for the women
ing." Marriage [under
84
a sort of civil death.

Some commentators have noted "[c]ommunity property.., is
wholly repugnant and inimical to the common law because of its
elevation of the wife to a position of equality with the husband
.... Each [spouse] is a distinct, separate person, capable of holding distinct and separate estates."8 5 In commenting on the adoption in the Western U.S. of the community property system from
Spanish law, two leading authors have reflected:
It seems safe to assume that the adoption of the community system
in all these western states was simply a reflection of the larger
movement toward improvement in the property status of the mar-

78. de Funiak & Vaughn, supra n. 46, at 2.
79. Reppy & Samuel, supra n. 9, at 1-6.
80. de Funiak & Vaughn, supra n. 46, at 309; Cal. Fain. Code § 751 (West 2006).
81. Reppy & Samuel, supra n. 9, at 1-2 (quoting Vaughn, supra n. 50, at 26 (internal
citations omitted)).
82. Id. (emphasis added).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1-6 (quoting Vaughn, supra n. 50, at 48).
85. Id. at 1-7 (quoting Vaughn, supra n. 50, at 48).
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ried women, its particular form being in large measure influenced
86
by California legislation.

B.
1.

The Effects of Time and Method of Acquisition

Determinationof Property's Character

The character of community property is determined at the
time of original acquisition.8 7 The basic California statute, which
is typical for community property states, provides: "Except as otherwise provided by statute, all property, real or personal, wherever situated, acquired by a married person during the marriage
while domiciled in this state is community property."8 8 In In re
Marriage of Haines,8 9 the California appellate court summarized
the applicable doctrines as follows:
Generally, factors determinative of whether property is separate or community are the time of the property's acquisition; operation of various presumptions; particularly those concerning the form
of title; and whether the spouses have transmuted or converted the
property from separate to community or vice versa.
Perhaps the most basic characterization factor is the time when
the property is acquired in relation to the parties' marital status.
The status of property as community or separate is normally determined at the time of its acquisition. This is particularly true because of the general presumption that property acquired during
marriage by either husband or wife or both while domiciled in California is community property, except as otherwise provided by statute. This rule can be altered by agreement of the spouses. For example, spouses can indicate their intent with respect to the character of the property initially by specifying the form of title in which it
is held, or spouses can later transmute the character of the property
90
as between each other.

In Haines, the wife had delivered a quitclaim deed of the
property in issue to the husband, thus vesting record title in him
alone. 9 1 The appellate court set aside the quitclaim deed and concluded that the realty property involved was still community prop86. Reppy & Samuel, supra n. 9, at 1-4 (quoting Vaughn, supra n. 50, at 36).
87. In re Marriage of Buol, 705 P.2d 354, 357 (Cal. 1985); In re Marriage of Bouquet,
546 P.2d 1371, 1376 (Cal. 1986) (stating "[t]he status of property as community or separate
is normally determined at the time of its acquisition" (internal quotations omitted)); In re
Summers, 332 F.3d 1240, 1242-43 (9th Cir. 2003) (applying California law) (internal citations omitted).
88. Cal. Fam. Code Ann. § 760 (West 2004 & Supp. 2008).
89. In re Marriage of Haines, 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 673 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 1995).
90. Id. at 682 (internal citations and quotations omitted). See infra pt. IV.C.7 regarding the requirements for effecting a transmutation.
91. Haines, 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 677.
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erty.9 2 There is a presumption that the record title correctly reflects the status (community or separate) of the property, 93 but the
Haines court held that the case was governed by the more specific
presumption that an advantage had been gained by the husband
through the exercise of undue influence in violation of his fiduciary duty to his spouse. 94 The California Legislature conditioned
the power of spouses to transact business with each other on their
95
compliance with the fiduciary standard.
2.

Property Acquired in a Community Property State

Property acquired by spouses while domiciled in a community
property state such as California is presumed to be community
property, unless it was owned before marriage or was acquired afterward by gift, inheritance, or by one of the other separate property categories described below. The enormous scope of the California statutory presumption that property acquired by the
spouses during marriage is community property is set forth in
Katz v. U.S.,96 in which the Ninth Circuit applied California law.
The court stated:
There is a statutory presumption that property acquired by the
spouses during marriage is community property. The presumption

is a strong one, which the California Supreme Court has characterized as fundamental to the community property system. It can be
overcome only by clear and satisfactory proof. It is even stronger
when the property was acquired with community property. It extends to every conceivable type of property, including insurance policies and their proceeds; a cause of action for wrongful death or injury to a minor child;.., a law practice; the interest of a spouse in a
partnership; good will of a business; borrowed money; and leasehold
97

interests.
The court there held that the community property character
of the assets conveyed to a trust continued to be community property.9 8 That rule is now statutory in California. California Family Code Annotated § 761 now provides in substance that: (1) unless the trust instrument or instrument of transfer expressly provides otherwise, community property that is transferred into a
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 689.
Id. at 682.
Id. at 689.
Id. at 684-85 n. 10; Cal. Fain. Code Ann. § 721(b) (West 2004 & Supp. 2008).
Katz v. U.S., 382 F.2d 723 (9th Cir. 1967).
Id. at 728 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 730.
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trust remains community property during the marriage, so long as
the trust is revocable during the marriage; and (2) any power to
modify may be exercised only with the joinder or consent of both
spouses. 99

Community property includes post-marriage personal earnings. In In re Marriage of House, 10 0 the California Court of Appeals held that a physician's earnings earned during marriage
were community property, as were the resulting receivables. 10 1
Finally, property is presumed to be community property if the
acquisition instrument describes the parties as husband and wife.
If the spouses acquire property under a deed or other written instrument in which they are described as husband and wife, that
description raises a presumption that the asset is community
property, unless a different intention is specifically stated in the
instrument. 102
IV.

THE IMPORTANCE OF COMMUNITY-SOURCE
PROPERTY IN MONTANA

A.

Montana Statutes Concerning Spouses' Rights in
Non-Community-Source Property

With respect to property that does not have its source in community property acquired in another state, Montana is a common
law (i.e., individual, separate property) jurisdiction. For example,
Montana Code Annotated § 40-2-201 specifies:
When husband's and wife's interests separate. Neither husband
nor wife has any interest in the property of the other, except as
be excluded from the other's
mentioned in 40-2-102, but neither can
10 3
dwelling unless enjoined by a court.

Montana Code Annotated § 40-2-202 provides:
All of the property of a married person owned before marriage and
that acquired afterward is his or her individual property. The mar99. Cal. Fam. Code Ann. § 761(a) (West 2006). Subsection (b) of this statute permits a
trust instrument to give the power to revoke to either spouse acting alone. Most California
lawyers do not do that because it tends to eviscerate an estate plan if unilateral revocation
powers are exercised.
100. In re Marriage of House, 123 Cal. Rptr. 451 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 1975).
101. Id. at 452; but see infra pt. IV.C.6 (discussing a "real" separation).
102. In re Marriage of Fabian, 715 P.2d 253, 256 (Cal. 1986); Katz, 382 F.2d at 729
(declaration of trust described the husband as "a married man" and the woman as "the
Trustor's wife" or "wife of the Trustor," so trust assets were presumed to be community
property); see also In re Marriage of Orchard, 273 Cal. Rptr. 499, 503 (Cal. App. 1st Dist.
1990).
103. Mont. Code Ann. § 40-2-102 (2007).
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ried person may, without the consent, agreement, and signature of
his spouse, convey and transfer his individual property, real or personal, including the fee simple title to real property, or execute a
power of attorney for the conveyance and transfer thereof.10 4

This parallels separate property under the community property
system. Similarly, Montana Code Annotated § 40-2-207 governs
the proceeds of a married person's work, providing that:
All work and labor performed by a married person for a person other
than his spouse and children shall, unless there is a written agreement on his part to the contrary, be presumed to be performed on
his separate account. This section does not affect the liability of
earnings for debts incurred for necessary articles procured for the
use and benefit of the married person, his spouse, or minor children,
as established by 40-2-205, 40-2-206, 40-2-209, and 40-2-210.105

Impact of the Uniform Dispositionof Community
Property Rights at Death Act

B.

Montana law is different for property that had its source in
out-of-state community property. In 1989, Montana adopted the
Uniform Disposition of Community Property Rights at Death
Act.106 The Act created a pair of rebuttable presumptions as follows:
(1) property acquired during marriage by a spouse of that marriage while domiciled in a jurisdiction under whose laws property
could then be acquired as community property [i.e., in a community
property state] is presumed to have been acquired as or to have become and remained [community] property to which this part applies; and
(2) real property situated in this state and personal property,
wherever situated, acquired by a married person while domiciled in
a jurisdiction under whose laws property could not then be acquired
as community property, title to which was taken in a form which
not to
created rights of survivorship [i.e., joint tenancy] is presumed
07
be [community] property to which this part applies.'

Although the language of § 72-9-103 is a little dense, its practical
effect is that property acquired by spouses while domiciled in a
community property state is not only presumed to have been acquired as community property, but also to have remained community property.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

§ 40-2-202.
§ 40-2-207.
§§ 72-9-101 to -120.
§ 72-9-103.
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This Act creates a presumptive vested right, effective upon
the death of a married person holding an interest in such community property.
Upon death of a married person, one-half of the [community] property to which this part applies is the property of the surviving
spouse and is not subject to testamentary disposition by the decedent or distribution under the Uniform Probate Code. One-half of
that [community] property is the property of the decedent and is
subject to testamentary disposition or distribution under the Uniform Probate Code. With respect to [community] property to which
this part applies, the one-half of the property which is the property
subject to the surviving spouse's right to elect
of the decedent is0 not
8
against the will.'

Thus, the effect of this section is to provide that upon death of
one spouse, only the deceased spouse's one-half interest in the presumed community property is subject to probate in Montana, and
that one-half is not subject to a widow's election. The other onehalf of the presumed community property, which would be the
surviving spouse's share, is not subject to probate upon the death
of the first spouse to die, and is not subject to federal estate tax. 10 9
This Act is extremely broad in its scope because under the
Montana Code, it applies to the disposition at death of the following property acquired by a married person:
(1)(a) all personal property, wherever situated, that was acquired
as or became and remained community property under the
laws of another [community property] jurisdiction;
(b) all or the proportionate part of that property acquired with
the rents, issues or income of, the proceeds from, or in exchange for that community property; or
(c) property traceable to that community property; or
(2) all or the proportionate part of any real property situated in this
state that was acquired with the rents, issues, or income of, the
proceeds from, or in exchange for property acquired as or which
became and remained community property under the laws of
another [community property]110jurisdiction, or property traceable
to that community property.

This section effectively reverses the practical effect of two normal Conflict of Laws rules. First, under the usual Conflict of
Laws rules, the character of real property located in the forum
state is typically determined by the law of that state."' Montana
is a separate property state, but by virtue of this Act, real property
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. at § 72-9-107.
U.S. v. Silverman, 859 F.2d 1352, 1353-54 (9th Cir. 1988).
Mont. Code Ann. § 72-9-102.
Eugene F. Scoles et al., Conflict of Laws § 20.2, 996 (3d ed., West 2000).
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that is presumed to be community property under other sections
of the Act, because it has its source in community property acquired elsewhere, is deemed community property in Montana
under the laws of the source state, upon the death of either coowner.
Second, under the normal Conflict of Laws rules, upon the
death of a person, the situs of moveable personal property is
deemed to be the state in which the decedent was domiciled at the
time of death, and the law of that situs governs the character of
the property. 1 12 However, under this Act, the domicile of the decedent in Montana at the time of death is irrelevant, because even
personal property (including that acquired by use of the rents, issues, income from, proceeds from, or exchange of property derived
from original community property) still remains community prop1 13
erty under Montana law.
Volume 8A of the Uniform Laws Annotated contains this Uniform Act. It does not disclose any decisions by any of the enacting
states. However, the Prefatory Note to the Act states:
This Act has a very limited scope. If enacted by a common law
state, it will only define the dispositive rights, at death, of a married
person as to his interests at death in property "subject to the Act,"
and is limited to real property, located in the enacting state, and
personal property of a person domiciled in the enacting state. The
purpose of the Act is to preserve the rights of each spouse in property which was community property prior to change of domicile, as
well as in property substituted therefor where the spouses have not
indicated an intention to sever or alter their "community" rights. It
thus follows the typical pattern of community property which permits the deceased spouse to dispose of "his half' of the community
property, while confirming the title of the surviving spouse in "her
11 4
half."

As noted earlier, the Montana Act relating to community
property affects not only family law, but also estate planning,
property transfers, probate practice, and federal estate tax returns. The effect of this law is so pervasive that it cannot be safely
ignored by a Montana lawyer.
A recent text on Conflict of Laws illustrates the effect of this
uniform law in the context of earlier common law, saying:
112. Id. at §§ 20.3-4, 999-1002.
113. Mont. Code Ann. § 72-9-102.
114. Uniform Disposition of Community Property Rights at Death Act, 8A U.L.A. 214
(2003).
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The leading American case involved a husband who wrongly
took funds belonging to the community from Louisiana and invested
them in Missouri land, taking title in his own name. The husband
was compelled to hold the title in trust to protect the wife's interests ....

This recognition of the tracing of community property

rights into assets held in common law states is confirmed in the
Uniform Disposition of Community Property at Death Act. If the
land in question is purchased partially with separate property and
partially with funds of the community, the question is complicated
as a mathematical matter but the principle of tracing does not
change, and the proportionate interests of the parties are recognized.115

As discussed further below, one of the key characteristics of
the community property system is that each spouse has an ex116
isting vested interest in the spouses' community property.
When the spouses are domiciled in a community property state,
their rights in their community property become vested when acquired. When they move to Montana, under the Uniform Act
quoted above, the property is presumed to continue to be community property and thus vested at the time of death. Hence, the
Act's Prefatory Note speaks to the purpose of preserving the rights
of each spouse in property that was community property prior to
1 17
change of domicile, as well as property substituted for it.
Montana law appears to be silent as to the status of the property between the time that a couple moves from a community
property state to Montana and the date of death of the first of the
spouses to die. Since, however, each spouse is deemed to have a
vested interest at the time the property was acquired, and is presumed to still have a vested interest at the time of his or her
death, logically the property must continue to be community property during the interval between the spouses' move to Montana
and the first spouse's death. This result seems to also be buttressed by the constitutional and other cases discussed below, and
by the Introduction to Tax Management Portfolio 802-2d.1 8 In a
marriage dissolution context, the importance of this vested interest is that upon a dissolution of marriage in Montana, a spouse
who had a community property interest may not be divested of
115. Scoles et al., supra n. 111, at § 14.6, 586 (discussing Depas v. Mayo, 11 Mo. 314, 49
Am. Dec. 88 (1848)) (internal citations omitted).
116. Reppy & Samuel, supra n. 9, at 1-6.
117. Uniform Disposition of Community Property Rights at Death Act, 8A U.L.A.
213-14.
118. Treacy, supra n. 6, at A-18.

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 2008

21

Montana Law Review, Vol. 69 [2008], Iss. 2, Art. 1

334

MONTANA LAW REVIEW

Vol. 69

that interest in the dissolution proceeding without due process of
law.
The California constitutional cases cited in Part V.A. 1 below,
which state the rule that a vested property interest cannot be
divested without due process, arose in the context of constitutionally impermissible, retroactive state legislation. The California
courts did not identify the category of due process to which they
were referring, but it was necessarily substantive due process. As
two commentators recently observed, "[s]ubstantive due process is
addressed to what government can do. Procedural due process inquires into the way government acts and the enforcement mechanisms it uses." 1 19
Before a federal court addresses a question of procedural due
process, the court must first find that a protected substantive
right or interest is at stake. As the U.S. Supreme Court stated in
120
American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co. v. Sullivan:
The first inquiry in every due process challenge is whether the
plaintiff has been deprived of a protected interest in "property" or
"liberty." Only after finding the deprivation of a protected interest
do we 1look to see if the State's procedures comport with due pro12
cess.
In Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co.,122 the Court expressed

this same concept in a property rights context, saying:
Justice Jackson, writing for the Court in Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 1 2 3 observed: "Many controversies have
raged about the cryptic and abstract words of the Due Process
Clause but there can be no doubt that at a minimum they require
that deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case." 124 At the outset, then, we are faced with what has
become a familiar two-part inquiry: we must determine whether Logan was deprived of a protected interest, and, if so, what process
was his due.
The first question, we believe, was affirmatively settled by the
Mullane case itself, where the Court held that a cause of action is a
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
species of property
12 5
Process Clause.
119. Jerome A. Barron & C. Thomas Dienes, ConstitutionalLaw in a Nutshell 253 (6th
ed. 2005).
120. Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40 (1999).
121. Id. at 59 (internal citations omitted).
122. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982).
123. Mullane v. C. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
124. Id. at 313.
125. Logan, 455 U.S. at 428.
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A protected property interest, such as a community property
interest, is derived from state law. In Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill,12 6 the Court observed that "[p]roperty interests
are not created by the Constitution, 'they are created and their
dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that
stem from an independent source such as state law.' "127 This author believes that a community property interest that was acquired in a community property state before the owner moved to
Montana qualifies for due process protection under both the U.S.
Constitution and state law.
In Logan, the U.S. Supreme Court considered a claim of
wrongful termination under the Illinois Fair Employment Practices Act. 128 The plaintiff charged that he had been deprived by a
state commission of a protected property interest in violation of
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 129 The
Court accepted his characterization of his claim as a property interest, saying:
[Tihe view that Logan's FEPA claim is a constitutionally protected
one follows logically from the Court's more recent cases analyzing
the nature of a property interest. The hallmark of property, the
Court has emphasized, is an individual entitlement grounded in
state law, which cannot be removed except "for cause." Once that
characteristic is found, the types of interests protected as "property"
are varied and, as often as not, intangible,
relating "to the whole
1 30
domain of social and economic fact."
Once the determination is made that a community property
interest is a substantively protected one, then the requirements of
procedural due process must be satisfied. At a minimum, procedural due process requires a procedure that provides "fundamen131
tal fairness."
As noted in Logan, such due process requires "notice and [an]
opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.' 3 2
This requirement for reasonable notice and an opportunity for a
hearing has been applied by the Supreme Court in a marriage dissolution case. 13 3 The notice element in a property case was articu126. Cleveland Bd. of Ed. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985).
127. Id. at 538 (quoting Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)); see also Paul v.

Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 709 (1976).
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Logan, 455 U.S. at 424.
Id. at 426-27.
Id. at 430 (internal citations omitted).
Lassiter v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 24-25 (1981).
Logan, 455 U.S. at 428.
Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U.S. 220, 229-34 (1946).
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lated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Lambert v. California1 3 4 as
follows:
Engrained in our concept of Due Process is the requirement of notice. Notice is sometimes essential so that the citizen has the
chance to defend charges. Notice is required before property interests are disturbed, before assessments are made, before penalties
a
are assessed. Notice is required in a myriad of situations where
135
penalty or forfeiture might be suffered for mere failure to act.
36

California agrees.'
If a Montana court handling a marriage dissolution proceeding, a contested probate, or other property entitlement proceeding
issued an order purporting to divest a party of a community property interest acquired in another state, the element of a hearing
would ordinarily be satisfied. If, however, the order proposed to
change or divest the character or ownership of that community
property interest, procedural due process requires that the party
be given reasonable notice. The notice required in a Montana dissolution case is not only that ownership of the property is to be
determined or allocated, but also that the community property
character of the property will be affected.
In light of this, any Montana attorney handling such a proceeding has an obligation to determine in advance whether a
party has a community property interest in the property subject to
the litigation, and to specifically advise both the party and the
court that a community property interest is at issue. If the ownership of the asset at issue is adjudicated without reasonable notice
that a community property interest is involved, any resulting order, as well as any asset allocation made by a settlement agreement, may well be void, or at least voidable, due to noncompliance
with procedural due process.
In many instances, the "equitable apportionment" of property
under Montana Code Annotated § 40-4-202 may provide a substantially similar result, even if community property interests are
not considered. The hazard, however, is that if notice is not given
that community property interests are to be divided, and after the
134. Lambert v. Cal., 355 U.S. 225 (1957).
135. Id. at 228.

136. See Anderson v. Super. Ct., 262 Cal. Rptr. 405, 407-09, 412 (Cal. App. 4th Dist.
1989) (lower court ordered custodial mothers who were exempt from work requirements for

Aid For Dependent Children, appearing in matters relating to fathers' child support obligations, to undertake job searches or have their AFDC benefits reduced; appellate court held
mothers' due process rights were violated by lack of adequate and timely notice, before
appearance, of procedure under which they might lose benefits).
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division the share allocated to one spouse appreciates materially
vis-A-vis the share allocated to the other, the spouse who received
the less-appreciating share is likely to seek a redetermination. In
such circumstances, the lack of due process notice can provide a
fertile ground for relitigation and for claims against counsel.
The California cases concerning marriage dissolution allow
an unequal division of the community property, so that each individual asset does not have to be split down the middle. However,
there must be an equitable division of the property-in effect, an
13 7
equivalence in value.
At the individual lawyer level, there is a danger that the lawyer will ignore community property aspects of a case. A Montana
practitioner who fails to assert and preserve his or her client's
community property interests in a Montana marriage dissolution
proceeding, or who fails to preserve community property in the
client's property transfers or estate planning documents, may be
doing so at his or her own peril. "An attorney who does not pursue
zealously the client's right to community property may face both
professional discipline and malpractice claims." 138 Community
property states differ enough that it will be as necessary to distinguish the state of origin of the community property (e.g., Texas as
opposed to California community property) as to distinguish acquisition periods (e.g., "pre-1927" versus "post-1927" California
community property 13 9 ) when statutes or other law changes apply
only prospectively.
The significance of the year 1927 in California law is that
prior to 1927, a wife had only an expectant interest. However, in
1927, the Legislature enacted a statute which expressly provided
that the respective interests of husband and wife in the community during the marriage are "present, existing and equal interests." Thus, after 1927, a wife in California has a complete and
140
existing one-half share.

137. In re Marriageof Tammen, 134 Cal. Rptr. 161, 163 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. 1976) (interpreting former Cal. Civil Code Ann. § 4800, now renumbered as Cal. Fain. Code Ann.
§§ 2601-28 (West 2004 & Supp. 2008)).
138. Mennell & Boykoff, supra n. 9, at 406.
139. de Funiak & Vaughn, supra n. 46, at 266.
140. Id. at 266-67 (quoting former Cal. Civ. Code Ann. § 5105 (West 1970), now renumbered as Cal. Civ. Code § 751 (West 2004)).
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C. Additional Special Rules and Practices That Govern
California Property (Community and Separate)
1. Rebuttable Presumption That Title Reflects True Character
of Property
In Haines, the court noted that there is a general common law
presumption in favor of the character of the property being determined by the form of title. 14 1 The court stated, "t]herefore, absent a contrary statute, and unless ownership interests are otherwise established by sufficient proof, record title is usually determi'1 4 2
native of characterization.'
However, a number of cases confirm that the form in which
record title is held is not controlling and that the court, upon appropriate proof, may determine the true character of the property
to be otherwise. 14 3 In other words, record title can be in either
spouse, and the property may still be held to be community prop44
erty. 1
2. Record Title May Be Held in One Spouse's Name as Business
Convenience
In a community property state it is not unusual for title to an
asset to be vested in one spouse alone, irrespective of its true character, as a business convenience. If one spouse is a participant
with other parties in a business, whether it is a partnership, limited liability company, or corporation, it is not at all unusual for
the other owner-members to insist that the title to that interest be
held solely in the name of the spouse who is the active participant
in the business.
Many business people are very reluctant to have the spouse of
a co-owner participating in business decisions of the business if
the spouse is not actively involved in the business and therefore
not knowledgeable about it. In those circumstances, record title
may be vested in the spouse who is the participant in the business
(whether it be husband or wife), in an effort to ameliorate this
practical problem. This "solution" does not of course solve the
141. In re Marriageof Haines, 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 673, 682 (Cal. App. 4th Dist 1995) (citing
Cal. Evid. Code Ann. § 662 (West 1995 & Supp. 2008)).
142. Id. at 682. The Haines court held that record title in the husband's name did not
control because he had obtained it by a breach of his fiduciary duty to his wife. Id. at 683.
143. Faustv. Faust, 204 P.2d 906, 908 (Cal. Dist. App. 1949); see also DeBoer v. DeBoer,
244 P.2d 953 (Cal. Dist. App. 1952); In re Kalben's Est., 273 P.2d 693 (Cal. Dist. App. 1954).
144. Id.
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problem in the event of a marriage dissolution, where the true
character of the property may be proved to be community, or in a
death situation in which the other business owners may be forced
to deal with the deceased owner's personal representative or trustee. Many small businesses endeavor to deal with this problem by
having a stock purchase agreement (or its partnership or limited
liability company equivalent) under which a deceased member's
interest may be bought out by the survivors shortly after death.
These arrangements are often funded by life insurance, but counsel needs to consider the tax implications of how the life insurance
is owned and who pays for it.
3. Tort Cause of Action Accrued during Marriage is Community
Property unless Parties Were Permanently Separated at
Accrual
Under California Family Code § 780, damages for personal injury, whether by judgment or settlement, are community property
if the cause of action arose during the marriage. 14 5 However, an
exception to that rule provides that such personal injury damages
are separate property if the cause of action arose while the parties
146
were living separate and apart.
In re Marriage of Klug 14 7 applied the same personal injury
rules to a cause of action for legal malpractice. 148 There, the husband had, with the assistance of an unethical attorney, transferred more than one-half million dollars from a community brokerage account to an account under his sole control in the Isle of
Man in England." 4 9 After the separation, the husband continued
to transfer large amounts of community property to other offshore
accounts, including an account in the Isle of Guernsey, and to an
overseas insurance company, all with the assistance of the attorney, but without the consent of the wife. 1 50
The wife subsequently sued the attorney for malpractice and
recovered a settlement of $346,000.151 In the dissolution case, the
145. Cal. Fam. Code Ann. § 780 (West 2004 & Supp. 2008).
146. Id. at § 781. However, as noted infra pt. IV.C.6, the separation must be "real" and
must not be a temporary arrangement.
147. In re Marriage of Klug, 31 Cal. Rptr. 3d 327 (Cal. App. 3d Dist. 2005).
148. Id. at 331-34.
149. Id. at 330.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 330-31.
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husband claimed half of that settlement. 15 2 The trial court
awarded the entire settlement to the wife on the ground that the
cause of action had arisen after the separation. 153 The appellate
court found that the wife's cause of action had matured at separation-in effect, that the duty of the attorney had arisen and it had
been breached, but that she had n6t yet sustained any injury that
was "legally cognizable as damages."15 4 Since, however, the offshore transfers benefited the husband rather than the attorney,
the doctrine of unclean hands precluded him from participating in
1 55 Hence, the $346,000
her settlement of the malpractice action.
156
property.
was held to be her separate
4. Family Law Presumes Jointly-Held Property to Be
Community Property but Only in Dissolution or Legal
Separation Proceedings
Property held in joint tenancy, tenancy in common, or tenancy
by the entireties form is presumed to be community property, but
only in dissolution or legal separation proceedings. This rule,
which is certainly contrary to a lawyer's normal intuition, first
came into existence in 1965 when the California Legislature enacted former Civil Code § 164.157 As then enacted, the statute
stated:
When a single family residence of a husband and wife is acquired by
them during marriage as joint tenants, for the purpose of the division of such property upon dissolution of marriage or legal separaresidence is the
tion only, the presumption is that such single family
158
community property of said husband and wife.

As noted later in a discussion concerning transfer of community property to a common law (separate property) jurisdiction,
the California Supreme Court in In re Marriage of Buol15 9 held
that this statute could not be applied retroactively.16° The much
152. Id. at 331.

153. Kug, 31 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 331.
154. Id. at 335.
155. Id. at 337.
156. Id.
157. Cal. Civ. Code Ann. § 164 (1965).
158. Id. This statute was later amended so it is no longer limited to the family home.
Cal. Civ. Code Ann. § 4800.1 (West 1984), now renumbered as Cal. Fam. Code § 2581 (West
2004 & Supp. 2008).
159. In re Marriageof Buol, 705 P.2d 354 (Cal. 1985).

160. Id. at 355.
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broader present rule is reflected in California Family Code § 2581,
which provides:
For the purpose of division of property on dissolution of marriage or legal separation of the parties, property acquired by the
parties during the marriage in joint form, including property held in
tenancy in common, joint tenancy, or tenancy by the entirety,1 or
as
61
community property, is presumed to be community property.

This is a rebuttable presumption affecting the burden of
proof. It may be rebutted by either: (1) a clear statement in the
deed or other document of title by which the property was acquired that it is separate property; or (2) proof that the parties
agreed in writing that the property is separate property. 16 2 In
Family Code § 2580, the Legislature specified that these provisions do not apply to property settlement agreements executed
before January 1, 1987, or to proceedings in which judgments
were rendered before January 1, 1987, regardless of whether
16 3
those judgments had become final.
Kane v. Huntley Financial 6 4 illustrates the risk of not recording a notice of pendency of action at the beginning of a marriage
dissolution case where there is a dispute concerning ultimate ownership of any real property. In Kane, the spouses had acquired a
residence, taking title in joint tenancy form.165 Shortly afterward,
the wife paid off the existing mortgage, and the husband orally
agreed that the property would be her separate property. 16 6 How16 7
ever, the joint tenancy record title remained unchanged.
The wife later filed a dissolution action.' 68 While it was pending, the husband applied for a loan from Huntley Financial, representing that he was married and living with his wife in the residence (the "living together" part was untrue).16 9 The lender approved a $12,000 loan, and the husband executed a deed of trust
purporting to encumber the entire interest in the residence as security for his note.' 70 The wife had no knowledge of this loan
161. Cal. Fain. Code Ann. § 2581 (West 2004 & Supp. 2008).
162. Id.; see infra pt. IV.C.7 regarding the requirements for transmutation.
163. Cal. Fam. Code Ann. § 2580. The statute's reference to a "written agreement"
seems to be intended to apply only to a prenuptial agreement or marital settlement agreement, because the requirements for a transmutation are more rigorous.
164. Kane v. Huntley Fin., 194 Cal. Rptr. 880 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 1983).
165. Id. at 881.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Kane, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 881.
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transaction and subsequently asked the trial court to declare the
deed of trust invalid. The trial court upheld the validity of the
171
deed of trust, and the wife appealed.
In its majority opinion, the Kane court noted that the wife had
failed to protect her separate property claim by failing to record a
lis pendens (also known as a "notice of pendency of action") to give
constructive notice to any encumbrancer of the pending title dispute. 17 2 The judgment in the dissolution proceeding declaring the
residence to be her separate property was not entered until after
the deed of trust to the lender had been recorded, so the benefici1 73
ary of the deed of trust was a bona fide encumbrancer.
In a footnote, the Kane court observed that the real property
had been acquired prior to January 1, 1975, at which time the
community property presumption applied "unless a different intention is expressed in the instrument [of acquisition]." 7 4 The
court also stated in that footnote that since the property had been
acquired in joint tenancy form, a different intent was expressed,
75
and the community property presumption did not apply.'
The court held that if the residence had been community
property, the entire property would (under the law as it then existed) be subject to execution for the husband's debt. 176 But "if the
property was held in joint tenancy, the wife's separate property
1 77
one-half interest would not be liable for her husband's debts."
The court concluded that under the case law, the wife's lack of
consent precluded the husband from encumbering the entire property, and he could instead encumber only his own interest. 7 8 His
interest was a one-half interest as a joint tenant, so the encumbrance on the property could attach only to his apparent one-half
79
interest.'
5. Characteristicsof Separate Property
When community property law was brought into the U.S.,
largely through adoption from Spain and Mexico, a second, con171. Id.
172. Id. at 882.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 883 n. 2.
175. Id.; but see In re Marriageof Haines, 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 673, 682 (Cal. App. 4th Dist.
1995) (reaching a contrary result on this point).
176. Kane, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 882.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 883.
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comitant doctrine accompanied it, namely that each of the spouses
could also have separate property. 18 0 In community property
states, "separate property" is that which belongs to one spouse
alone, and which that spouse can control, sell, or otherwise convey, gift, encumber, or dispose of by will or trust without the consent or joinder of the other spouse.'18 Because of the presumption
that all property acquired by the spouses during the marriage is
community property, countries and states that adopted the community property system found it necessary to specifically delineate what is separate property, in order to make clear which categories of property are not subject to the community property presumption.
Separate property is often described as property owned by a
person before marriage or acquired after marriage by gift or inheritance.' 8 2 However, as noted below, the categories are in fact
broader. In California, the doctrine is codified in Family Code
§ 770 and in the California Law Revision Comment to § 760.183
In California, the categories of separate property include:
1. All property owned before marriage.
2. All property acquired by the person after marriage by gift, bequest, devise, or descent.
3. The rents, issues, and profits of separate property. 8 4
4. Earnings and accumulations while living separate and
85
apart.1
5. Earnings and accumulations after entry of a judgment of legal
86
separation.'
6. Personal injury damages in which the cause of action arose
while the injured person was living separate and apart from the
other spouse, or after the entry of a judgment of dissolution of
marriage or legal separation.' 8 7 As noted above, the court in the
recent Kug case extended this statutory rule to a claim for legal
180. In re Marriageof Baragry, 140 Cal. Rptr. 779, 781 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 1977).
181. See e.g. Witkin, supra n. 40, at §§ 5-6; Cal. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 752, 770(a), 771(a)
(West 2004 & Supp. 2008); Cal. Prob. Code Ann. § 6100 (West 1991 & Supp. 2008); Reppy
& Samuel, supra n. 9, 5-2 to 5-4; In re Est. of Clark, 271 P. 542 (Cal. Dist. App. 1928); de
Funiak & Vaughn, supra n. 46, at 114-232.
182. de Funiak & Vaughn, supra n. 46, at 114-15.
183. Cal. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 760, 770.
184. Id. at § 770.
185. Id. at § 771. However, the separation must not be a simply temporary one, but
must be "real." Baragry, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 781.
186. Cal. Fam. Code. Ann. § 772.
187. Id. at § 781.
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malpractice,""' so it presumably also extends to other tort-based
recoveries. The court in Kug also relied on California Family
8 9 Section
Code § 2556, dealing with division of omitted assets.'
2603 refers only to a "cause of action for the damages" without
limiting the nature of the cause of action or referring to when it
arose. 190
7. Property that has been transmuted from community property
9
to separate property by written agreement of the parties.' '
8. Property acquired by a married woman prior to January 15,
1975, in her name alone, by an instrument in writing. Such prop19 2
erty is presumed to be the woman's own separate property.
That presumption is, however, limited to acquisitions made prior
to January 15, 1975, and no longer applies to later property acqui93
sitions. 1
6. What Constitutes a "Separation"for Purposes of
CharacterizingPost-SeparationEarningsas Separate
Property?
California Family Code § 771 and its predecessors have long
provided that the earnings of a spouse "while living separate and
94
apart from the other spouse" are his or her separate property.
For this purpose, the separation must be "real." Courts generally
require that at least one party have an intention to end the marriage and not return to the other spouse, and that his or her con195
duct evidence that intention.
96
The most extreme example is In re Marriage of Baragry.1
There, the earning physician separated from his wife and lived
with his girlfriend for four years. 1 97 But during that entire period,
he took the wife out to social occasions, sent her numerous birthday and anniversary cards, filed an enrollment card at their
daughter's school stating (falsely) that the girl lived at home with
188. In re Marriageof Kug, 31 Cal. Rptr. 3d 327, 334 (Cal. App. 3d Dist. 2005).
189. Id. at 332.
190. Cal. Fam. Code Ann. § 2603.
191. Id. at §§ 850-53 (see infra pt. IV.C.7 regarding the requirements for such a transmutation).
192. Cal. Civ. Code Ann. § 5110 (West 1970).
193. Cal. Fam. Code Ann. § 803 (West 2004 & Supp. 2008).
194. Cal. Fain. Code Ann. § 771; Cal. Civ. Code Ann. § 5118 (West 1970 & Supp. 1982).
195. See e.g. In re Marriageof Norviel, 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d 148, 160 (Cal. App. 6th Dist.
2002) (Bamattre-Manoukian, J., dissenting).
196. In re Marriageof Baragry, 140 Cal. Rptr. 779 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 1977).
197. Id. at 780.

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol69/iss2/1

32

Willey: Community-Source Property

2008

COMMUNITY-SOURCE PROPERTY

345

both parents, filed joint income tax returns, paid all household
bills, and supported his family. 198 He even brought his laundry to
his wife's home while he was living with the girlfriend. 19 9 When
divorce finally ensued, he claimed all his post-separation earnings
were his separate property. 20 0 The court rejected his "polygamous
lifestyle" and said no separation had occurred until the divorce action was filed. 20 ' Thus, a separation must be "real" in order for
post-separation earnings to constitute separate property.
7. Transmutationof Separate Property to Community or Vice
Versa
The term "transmutation" is a term of art under California
law. 20 2 It is used to describe a transformation of separate property into community property or vice-versa. 20 3 The California legislature and California courts apparently adopted this terminology because the alternative term, "conversion," connotes a civil
20 4
theft.
Prior to 1984, spouses in California could orally transmute
their respective properties from separate to community and vice
versa. 20 5 This gave rise to a great deal of suspect testimony in
marriage dissolution cases-it became virtually customary for a
spouse who had the lesser share of property to claim that the
other spouse had orally agreed to transmute his or her separate
property into community property. This became known colloquially as the "pillow talk rule."
In 1984, the California Legislature changed the law to require
a written agreement in order to effect a transmutation, whether
the property involved was real property or personal property. 20 6
The present transmutation statute contained in the Family Code
states: "A transmutation of real or personal property is not valid
unless made in writing by an express declaration that is made,
198. Id. at 781.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 782.
202. Cal. Fain. Code Ann. § 850 (West 2004 & Supp. 2008).
203. Id.
204. Black's Law Dictionary, 356-57 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 8th ed., West 2004).
205. Luders v. Pummer, 313 P.2d 38, 39 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 1957); In re Bernatas, 328
F.2d 539, 541 (Cal. Dist. App. 1958).
206. Cal. Civ. Code Ann. § 5110.730 (West 1984).

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 2008

33

Montana Law Review, Vol. 69 [2008], Iss. 2, Art. 1

346

MONTANA LAW REVIEW

Vol. 69

the spouse whose interest in
joined in, consented to, or accepted by
20 7
affected."
adversely
is
the property
20 8
The leading illustrative case is Estate of MacDonald.
There, the husband had deposited community funds into a bank
the wife had signed a form providing
retirement account, and
"consent of a spouse. '20 9 The parties knew the wife was then dying of cancer and had agreed to divide their respective properties
so there would be no co-owned property at the time of her
death. 2 10 The California Supreme Court held that the mere consent provision did not effect a transmutation because there was no
"express declaration" as required by the statute. 2 11 While the
Court stopped short of requiring specific reference to a "transmutation," "community property," or "separate property," it held that
the intent must be clear. 21 2 For example, a party could state, "I
give to the account holder any interest I have in the funds deposited in this account. 21 3
The requirements of the transmutation statute are strictly
construed. In In re Marriageof Benson,21 4 the parties had entered
into an oral transmutation agreement, which had been partly performed. 2 15 The California Supreme Court ruled that the part performance was not sufficient to satisfy the requirement of the stat21 7
ute2 16 that a transmutation is not valid unless made in writing.
The Court determined that the legislature had intentionally imposed strict standards for transmutations in order to reduce dis21 8 These
putes and perjury in marriage dissolution proceedings.
standards are more rigorous than those imposed by the statute of
2 19
frauds.
The provisions of this transmutation statute can be a trap,
because actions a layman might regard as sufficient to demonstrate intent may fail to meet the statutory requirements. For ex207.
Ann. §
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

Cal. Fam. Code Ann. § 852(a) (West 2004 & Supp. 2008) (formerly Cal. Civ. Code
5110.730) (emphasis added).
In re Est. of MacDonald, 794 P.2d 911 (Cal. 1990).
Id. at 918.
Id. at 913.
Id. at 919.
Id.
Id.
In re Marriage of Benson, 116 P.3d 1152 (Cal. 2005).
Id. at 1154.
Id.; Cal. Fam. Code Ann. § 852(a) (West 2004 & Supp. 2008).
Benson, 116 P.3d at 1154.
Id. at 1156.
Id. at 1160.
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ample, an instruction by one spouse to "journal" stock in his stock
brokerage account into the other spouse's brokerage account was
held insufficient to constitute a transmutation because it did not
expressly state that the characterization or ownership of the
properties was to be changed, and instead appeared to refer only
2 20
to the brokerages' internal recordkeeping.
Likewise, a recital in a husband and wife family trust providing, "[s]ettlors declare that any community property transferred to
the Trust shall retain its character as such, notwithstanding the
transfer to the Trust," was also held insufficient to establish a
transmutation of husband's substantial separate property into
community property. 2 2 1 The court concluded that the trust's purposes were to avoid probate and provide for orderly administration, and that no provision of the trust contained the required express declaration that the husband was unambiguously effecting a
2 22
change of ownership in his separate property estate.
At the same time, a valid transmutation can be made under
circumstances which may initially seem doubtful. In In re
Roosevelt,2 23 the Ninth Circuit applied California law to determine whether a marital agreement constituted a fraudulent conveyance under the Bankruptcy Act. The parties had purchased a
residence, taking title in joint tenancy. When the marriage began
to disintegrate, they executed a marital agreement which divided
all of their community property and provided that their residence
would be changed into the wife's separate property. The provision
concerning that property stated: "Steven and Judy agree that [the
residence] and any property hereafter acquired by Judy during
the marriage by any means including but not limited to purchase,
gift, bequest, devise, or descent shall be and remain her separate
2 24
property."
The court found that under California law the spouses could
properly transmute their respective properties by an agreement
that complied with the statutes so long as it "contain [ed] language
which expressly state [d] that the characterization or ownership of
the property [was] being changed." 2 25 The transmutation was ac220. In re Marriage of Barneson, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 726, 731 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. 1999).
221. In re Marriage of Starkman, 28 Cal. Rptr. 3d 639, 641 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 2005).
222. Id. at 643.
223. In re Roosevelt, 87 F.3d 311 (9th Cir. 1996), overruled on other grounds, In re Banner, 131 F.3d 788 (9th Cir. 1997).
224. Id. at 313-15 (emphasis omitted).
225. Id. at 314 (citing In re Est. of MacDonald, 794 P.2d 911, 918 (Cal. 1990)).
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and not
cordingly held not to constitute a fraudulent conveyance,
2 26
bankruptcy.
in
husband
the
of
to bar a discharge
A quitclaim deed from one spouse to the other is often used by
California lawyers to effect a relinquishment by one spouse of a
property interest in real property previously owned (or claimed)
by both spouses. The older opinion in In re Marriage of Broderick 22 7 upheld a quitclaim deed from wife to husband, even though
the husband paid her only $3,000 in exchange for her half interest

in the family home, which was worth over

$13,000.228

It seems

doubtful that the same result would follow today. In Haines, the
court voided a similar quitclaim deed on the ground that the husband exercised undue influence in violation of his fiduciary duties.

2 29

If there is any hint of overreaching or bad faith, such a quitclaim deed is likely to be set aside. In the wake of MacDonald and
the express provisions of the statute, a quitclaim deed intended to
effect a transmutation should probably contain two specific recitals. First, it should state that the property is being conveyed 2to
30
the other spouse "as his [or her] sole and separate property.
a relinSecond, it should recite that the deed is intended to effect
23 1
quishment of the transferor's interest in the property.
Notwithstanding the ambiguity of the case law, California title companies will still ordinarily insure title in one spouse, based
on a quitclaim deed from the other spouse, if the quitclaim was
given within some specified period of time (usually not more than
five years). If the quitclaim deed is older than that, many title
companies will insist on a new quitclaim deed being recorded
before they will insure title. Title companies are, however, increasingly discouraging use of quitclaim deeds. Instead, the companies ask that parties who wish to effect such a transfer use a
grant deed, because it transfers after-acquired title.

226. Id. at 318-19. In denying rehearing, the Court made a number of small changes in
its opinion, but they do not seem to affect the transmutation issue. See Booker v. Edwards,
99 F.3d 1169 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
227. In re Marriage of Broderick, 257 Cal. Rptr. 397, 403.
228. Id. at 403.
229. In re Marriage of Haines, 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 673, 689 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 1995).
230. MacDonald, 794 P.2d at 919.
231. Id.
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8. The "Sandwich"Problem: When One Spouse Expends
Personal Efforts or Community Assets during Marriage to
Improve or Increase Value of Other Spouse's Separate Property
In In re Marriage of Moore,2 3 2 the wife made the down payment on the purchase of a house, but community funds were used
to make subsequent payments on the mortgage loan. 23 3 The California Supreme Court ruled that where community funds were
used to make payments on property purchased by one of the
spouses before marriage, "the rule developed through decisions in
California gives to the community a pro tanto community property
interest in such property in the ratio that the payments on the
purchase price with community funds bear to the payments made
with separate funds."2 34 In other words, use of the community
funds creates a community property "layer" in the property "sandwich."
Effective January 1, 1984, the California Legislature adopted
former Civil Code § 4800.2, which allows reimbursement to be
made before community property is divided, for any separate
property contribution made to property that is later to be divided
as community property. 2 35 In In re Marriage of Fabian,2 36 the
California Supreme Court held this statute could not be applied
retroactively, because to do so would be a violation of due process. 2 37 Subsequently, the California Legislature amended the
statute to provide that it would only apply prospectively. 238 In In
re Marriage of Heikes,2 39 the California Supreme Court held the
reimbursement statute was "limited by the due process clause to
property acquired on or after January 1, 1984."24 0 When either
spouse's separate property funds are invested in community assets, the party claiming the benefit of the contribution must provide adequate evidence by tracing the property (typically separate
24 1
property) so invested.
232. In re Marriage of Moore, 618 P.2d 208 (Cal. 1980).
233. Id. at 209.
234. Id. at 210 (quoting Forbes v. Forbes, 118 Cal. App. 2d 324, 325 (1953) (emphasis
added)).
235. Cal. Civ. Code Ann. § 4800.2 (West 1984).
236. In re Marriage of Fabian, 715 P.2d 253 (Cal. 1986).
237. Id. at 260.
238. Cal. Civ. Code Ann. § 4800.2.
239. In re Marriage of Heikes, 899 P.2d 1349 (Cal. 1995).
240. Id. at 1358.
241. See e.g. In re Marriage of Aufmuth, 152 Cal. Rptr. 668, 674 (Cal. App. 1st Dist.
1979) (superseded by statute); In re Marriageof Allen, 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d 887, 893 (Cal. App.
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The "sandwich" problem also arises when one spouse exercises personal efforts to improve the value of separate property
owned by the other spouse. This may, for example, arise through
one spouse's management of the other spouse's separate property
business, stock portfolio, or real property. In each instance, the
question is how much of the appreciation is to be allocated to the
separate property owned by one spouse and how much is to be
allocated to the spouse who has performed the value-increasing
work.

24 2

California courts have adopted two alternative case-law approaches to determine the community property share. First,
under Pereira v. Pereira,24 3 the court may simply allocate to the
separate property a reasonable rate of return on the original investment and allocate any increase above that amount to community property. 24 4 Alternatively, as demonstrated in Van Camp v.
Van Camp,24 5 the court may determine the reasonable value of
the community services and allocate that amount to the community, treating the balance as separate property attributable to the
2 46
inherent nature of the estate.
In In re Marriageof Folb,24 7 the California Court of Appeals
used the Pereiraapproach and a twelve percent rate of return to
determine the value of the husband's separate property invested
capital. 248 It did so in substantial part because it found that the
husband was an "unusually skillful developer of raw land," and
that his personal efforts and management (which were community
24 9
property) were responsible for most of the increase in value.
The Nevada Supreme Court also adopted the Pereira apportion25 0
ment formula in Cord v. Neuhoff.
In Beam v. Bank of America,251 the California Supreme Court
held that "[i]n making an apportionment between separate and
community property, [the California courts have] developed 'no
precise criterion or fixed standard, but have endeavored to adopt a
2d Dist. 2002) (holding community entitled to reimbursement of community funds used to
make improvements on husband's separate property residence).
242. Beam v. Bank of America, 490 P.2d 257, 261 (Cal. 1971).
243. Pereira v. Pereira, 103 P. 488 (Cal. 1909)
244. Id. at 491.
245. Van Camp v.Van Camp, 199 P. 885 (Cal. Dist. App. 1921).
246. Id. at 889-90.
247. In re Marriage of Folb, 126 Cal. Rptr. 306 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 1975).
248. Id. at 314.
249. Id.
250. Cord v.Neuhoff, 573 P.2d 1170, 1173 (Nev. 1978).
251. Beam v.Bank of Am., 490 P.2d 257 (Cal. 1971).
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yardstick which is most appropriate and equitable in a particular
situation.' ",252 The Beam Court also said that the proper formula
depends on "whether the character of capital investment in the
separate property or the personal activity, ability, and capacity of
the spouse is the chief contributing factor in the realization of income and profits." 25 3 In In re Marriageof Lopez,254 the California
Court of Appeal said the Van Camp formula is the appropriate one
when the "husband's efforts had a minor influence on the growth
of the investment." 25 5
V.

PROPERTY ACQUIRED IN MONTANA WITH COMMUNITY-SOURCE
PROPERTY REMAINS COMMUNITY PROPERTY, EVEN THOUGH

NOT HELD OF RECORD AS SUCH

A.
1.

ConstitutionalLaw Cases

The California Cases

The California constitutional cases arose in the context of an
enactment (then-Civil Code § 4800.1)256 that was intended to apply retroactively and materially changed the existing law. The enactment provided that the only means of rebutting the presumption that the property acquired during marriage and held in joint
tenancy form was community property was by providing evidence
of a written agreement that the property was separate property.25 7 In Buol, the California Supreme Court determined, "retroactive application of section 4800.1 would operate to deprive
[the wife] of a vested property right without due process of law. At
the time of trial, [the wife] had a vested property interest in the
'25 8
residence as her separate property.
In reaching its decision, the Buol Court stated, "[dlestroying
enforcement of a vested right is... tantamount to destroying the
right itself."25 9 It also added, "[i]nsofar as it applies retroactively,
252. Id. at 261 (quoting Logan v. Forster, 114 Cal. App. 2d 587, 599-600 (1952)).
253. Id. (quoting Logan, 114 Cal. App. 2d at 599-600) (internal citations omitted).
254. In re Marriage of Lopez, 113 Cal. Rptr. 58 (Cal. App. 3d Dist. 1974).
255. Id. at 66.
256. Cal. Civ. Code Ann. § 4800.1 (West 1984).
257. Id.
258. In re Marriage of Buol, 705 P.2d 354, 357 (Cal. 1985) (citing Cal. Const. art. I, § 7)
(emphasis added). At that time, spouses could convert separate property into community
or vice versa by oral agreement. That is no longer the law of California.
259. Id. at 358 (quoting Baldwin v. City of San Diego, 15 Cal. Rptr. 576, 578 (Cal. Dist.
App. 1961)).
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the statute imposes an irrebuttable presumption barring recognition of the vested separate property interest."260 The Court's discussion of the issues seems to indicate the character of the property right was vested prior to the legislative enactment. That rationale is equally applicable to an interest in community property,
since the two categories of property are the essential components
of the California community property system. The statute considered in Buol provided that it was applicable to all property divisions that were not yet final on January 1, 1984.261 In Buol, the
judgment dividing the community property had been entered, but
was not yet final on January 1, 1984.262
Similarly, in Fabian, the California Supreme Court also held
retroactive application of former Civil Code § 4800.2 to cases
pending on January 1, 1984, "impair[ed] vested property interests
263
without due process of law."
In Heikes, the California Supreme Court dealt with the right
to reimbursement when a couple separates. 2 64 In Heikes, the husband conveyed an unimproved parcel to himself and his wife as
joint tenants in 1976.265 At that time, the community property
presumption relating to a joint tenancy property applied only to a
"single family residence" and not to unimproved land. 26 6 The California Supreme Court stated that:
In Buol, we held that the provision of [Civil Code] section
4800.1 requiring a writing to rebut the presumption that property
acquired in joint tenancy is community property could not constitutionally be applied to deprive Mrs. Buol of her vested property interest without due process of law. Here, however, Buol does not preclude retroactive application of section 4800.1's presumption that
the unimproved parcel conveyed by husband to himself and wife in
joint tenancy is community property, because husband held no
vested property right, as joint tenant of the parcel, that he would
not also have held as owner of a community property interest while
26 7
both spouses were still alive.

Thus, the doctrine of a constitutionally protected, vested property interest was applied to a community property interest. At the
time of the Heikes decision, California had adopted another stat260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.

Id.
Id.
Id.
In
In
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 359.
at 356 (citing Cal. Civ. Code Ann. § 4800.1).
re Marriage of Fabian, 715 P.2d 253, 260 (Cal. 1986) (emphasis added).
re Marriage of Heikes, 899 P.2d 1349, 1349-50 (Cal. 1995).
at 1350.
at 1352.
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ute, former Civil Code § 4800.2, which required reimbursement
for separate property contributions made to the acquisition of any
property the court later divided as community property in a dissolution proceeding. 2 68 In Heikes, the husband transferred two unimproved parcels to his wife and himself in joint tenancy. This
transaction changed the property to community property in anticipation of a dissolution. He attempted to claim a reimbursement

under section 4800.2.269
As noted above, the Court in Buol stated, "[tihe status of property as community or separate is normally determined at the time
of its acquisition." 2 70 The Buol Court also overruled five prior Cal27 1
ifornia cases that held the contrary.
2.

The Respective ConstitutionalProvisions

The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides in
time-honored language that "[n]o person shall . . .be deprived of
life, liberty or property without due process of law." 2 72 The Fourteenth Amendment in turn provides, "nor shall any state deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law."2 73
The California constitutional provision on which the Buol
Court relied states, "[a] person may not be deprived of life, liberty
or property without due process of law or denied equal protection
of the laws." 27 4 Likewise, the Montana Constitution, in article II,
section 17 provides that "[n]o person shall be deprived of life, lib2 75
erty, or property without due process of law."
3.

The Federal ConstitutionalCases

The above-quoted California cases unequivocally establish
that a community property interest is, under California state law,
a constitutionally protected property interest. State law determines the nature and extent of the property interest for federal
due process purposes. In Dunbar Corporationv. Lindsey,2 76 plain268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.

Cal. Civ. Code Ann. § 4800.2 (West 1984).
Heikes, 899 P.2d at 1352-53.
In re Marriageof Buol, 705 P.2d 354, 357 (Cal. 1985) (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 362 n. 10.
U.S. Const. amend. V.
U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
Cal. Const. art. 1, § 7.
Mont. Const. art. II, § 17.
Dunbar Corp. v. Lindsey, 905 F.2d 754 (4th Cir. 1990).
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tiff Dunbar asserted that various representatives of the U.S. had
unconstitutionally seized possession of its land without due process in violation of the Fifth Amendment. 2 77 The property at issue
was located in North Carolina. 278 The court stated:
Under the first inquiry, North Carolina law determines
whether Dunbar has any property rights protected by the Fifth
Amendment's Due Process Clause....
Under the second inquiry, it is plain that the Due Process
Clause does not safeguard only the rights of undisputed ownership.
Instead, it has been read broadly to extend protection to any significant property interest.... Due process "extends to property rights
less substantial than full legal title ....
right to possession constitutes property.

Even a merely arguable

2 79

Research to date has not disclosed any U.S. Supreme Court
cases dealing with an individual's interest in community property,
other than cases that dealt expressly with federal preemption of
state law. 28 0 For example, in Emard v. Hughes Aircraft Co.,21 the
Ninth Circuit stated, "[i]n Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon . . .
the [Supreme] Court stated that 'a state law may "relate to" a benefit plan, and thereby be preempted, even if the law is not specifically designed to affect such plans, or the effect is only indirect.'
"282 The California courts have recognized that Social Security
benefits are governed exclusively by the Social Security Act and
property assets would
that treating them as divisible community
28 3
be forbidden by the Supremacy Clause.
The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution has long
been interpreted to apply the requirements of the Fifth Amendment to State action, including the Equal Protection Clause. 28 4 In
277. Id. at 755.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 760 (internal citations omitted).
280. See e.g. Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 836 (1997) (holding that Louisiana's law of
community property conflicted with, and therefore was preempted by, ERISA's survivor's
annuity and anti-alienation provisions and by ERISA's definition of "beneficiary"); see also
Emard v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 153 F.3d 949, 962 (9th Cir. 1998) (recognizing a spouse's
one-half community property interest in the proceeds of life insurance policies that were
purchased with community property funds and holding that ERISA preemption did not
preclude application of California's law of constructive trusts or its law of community property) (abrogated by Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141 (2001)).
281. Emard v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 153 F.3d 949, 962 (9th Cir. 1998).
282. Emard, 153 F.3d at 953 (quoting Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133,
139 (1990)).
283. In re Marriage of Nizenkoff, 135 Cal. Rptr. 189, 192 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. 1976).
284. See e.g. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1948) (striking down racial covenants in real estate); N.Y Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 264 (1964) (holding Alabama's common law of libel is a state action that must comply with the First Amendment);
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Kirchberg v. Feenstra,2 5 the U.S. Supreme Court struck down a
Louisiana statute that made the husband "head and master" of
property held jointly with his wife and permitted him to dispose of
such property without the wife's consent. 28 6 The Court held this
statute constituted gender-based discrimination in violation of the
2 7
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
It appears that under Montana law, state action is inherently
involved in a marriage dissolution action, even if the action is resolved by agreement. The Montana Code contemplates that the
court will evaluate a settlement agreement to determine that the
agreement is "not unconscionable." 28 8 However, this criteria is
applicable only if the property division is resolved by agreement.
If there is no such agreement, the court must itself make the division, in which case the "equitable apportionment" standard pro28 9
vided by Montana Code Annotated § 40-4-202 governs.
Based on the above authorities, it is respectfully submitted
that any action by a Montana court which endeavored to deprive
either a husband or a wife of his or her respective previouslyvested community property interest, without the requisite prior
notice that the community interested was being affected, would
violate both due process and equal protection.
B. Non-ConstitutionalState Cases Confirming That
Community Property CharacterIs Not Lost When
Spouses Move Property to a Common
Law State
In Tomaier v. Tomaier,290 spouses who were residents in California used community property funds to purchase land in Mis291
souri, taking title to the Missouri property in joint tenancy.
The California Supreme Court held:
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 (1954); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies 478-510, 648-82 (2d ed., Aspen 2002).
285. Kirchberg v. Feenstra,450 U.S. 455 (1981).
286. Id. at 461-63.
287. Id. at 459-60; see also Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 283 (1979) (striking down a state
statute providing husbands, but not wives, may be required to pay alimony upon divorce,
as a violation of equal protection).
288. Mont. Code Ann. § 40-4-201 (2007); In re Marriageof Miller, 777 P.2d 319, 322-23
(Mont. 1989).
289. Miller, 777 P.2d at 322-23.
290. Tomaier v. Tomaier, 146 P.2d 905 (Cal. 1944).
291. Id. at 906.
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The plaintiff should have been permitted to introduce evidence
that the property in Missouri, as well as in California, was purchased with community funds with the intention that it remain part
of the community. Property rights are not lost simply because propinto another state and exchanged there for other
erty is transported
292
property.

In Quintana v. Ordono,29 3 the husband and wife had been
married in Cuba, a community property jurisdiction, and had resided there for many years. 2 94 During the marriage, the husband
purchased stock in a Florida corporation. 2 95 Upon his death, the
widow claimed the stock on the ground that the purchase price
had been paid from Cuba-source assets. 296 The Florida court held
that under the laws of Cuba, ownership of the stock vested not in
the husband, in whose sole name the stock had been taken, but
instead in the marital community, saying, "[t]hus, the wife had a
vested interest in the stock equal to that of her husband. The interest that vested in the wife was not affected by the subsequent
change of domicile from Cuba to Florida in 1960."297
Other common law states have held that a change of domicile
and the situs of community personal property does not convert the
true character of ownership into a common law form. Rather, the
property is still community, even though husband and wife have
become domiciliaries of a common law state. 2 98 In State v.
Bejarano,29 9 the wife claimed rights to pension benefits of the husband after the couple moved from California to Texas and then to
Colorado. 3 00 (Both California and Texas are community property
states.) The Colorado Court held that "community property retains its characteristics as such when it is remanded to a common
law state."30 1
In Newman v. Newman, 30 2 the wife argued that the husband's
military pension had accrued while the couple was domiciled in
California even though the husband resided in Mississippi part of
292. Id. at 907-08 (internal citations omitted).
293. Quintana v. Ordono, 195 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 3d Dist. App. 1967).
294. Id. at 578.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 579.
297. Id. at 580.
298. See e.g. Cmmw. v. Terjen, 90 S.E.2d 801, 802, 804 (Va. 1956); In re Kessler's Est.,
203 N.E.2d 221, 222-23 (Ohio 1964).
299. State v.Bejarano, 358 P.2d 866 (Colo. 1961).
300. Id. at 867.
301. Id. at 868.
302. Newman v. Newman, 558 So. 2d 821 (Miss. 1990).
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that time. 30 3 The Mississippi Court seemed to adopt the California approach of pro rata division of the asset to solve the problem
of ownership rights, because the asset had been acquired in two
30 4
jurisdictions over a long period of time.
VI.

APPLICATION OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY LAW TO
NONTRADITIONAL RELATIONSHIPS

A.

CaliforniaDomestic Partnerships

In 2003, California adopted the California Domestic Partner
Rights and Responsibilities Act, which extended almost all of the
non-tax rights, responsibilities, and duties enjoyed by married
persons to "registered domestic partners" who have filed the requisite declaration with the Secretary of State.30 5 Although the
section dealing with rights, responsibilities, and duties equates
those of domestic partners to those of "spouses," 30 6 the provision
for termination (dissolution of a domestic partnership) reflects the
underlying legislative intent by referring expressly to community
property. 30 7 In 2006 the Legislature deleted the previous income
tax distinction, 30 so that now California domestic partners may
file joint income tax returns, just like a married couple.
Persons eligible to qualify as domestic partners include: (a)
persons of the same sex or (b) persons of the opposite sex if one or
both is eligible for old-age Social Security benefits and is over
sixty-two years of age. 30 9 This latter, age-related provision not
only affects potential loss of Social Security benefits but may also
affect continuing eligibility for spousal support, which would also
be lost by remarriage. Some older adults may also be reluctant to
remarry because of the effect on the inheritance rights of children
from an earlier union or because of the economic impact on limited
retirement assets if a later-life marriage fails.

303. Id. at 822-23.
304. Id. at 825 n. 1.
305. Cal. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 297-299.6 (West 2004 & Supp. 2008).
306. Id. at § 297.5.
307. Id. at § 299.6.
308. In re MarriageCases, __ P.3d __, 2008 WL 2051892, *24 (Cal. May 15, 2008).
309. Cal. Fam. Code Ann. § 297(b)(6)(B).
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Washington Law: Property Acquired by Unmarried
Persons Treated as Community Property upon
Termination of Relationship

Washington state courts characterize unmarried cohabitants
as participants in a "meretricious relationship."' 3 10 The courts do
not use this term in a pejorative sense; it is merely descriptive.
The Washington Supreme Court determined in Connell v. FranCiSCo

3 11

that once a meretricious relationship is found to have been

established by an application of five enumerated factors, then
upon termination of the relationship a just and equitable distribution must be made of "property that would have been characterized as community property had the parties been married." 3 1 2 In
so deciding, the Court stated:
We hold income and property acquired during a meretricious relationship should be characterized in a similar manner as income and
property acquired during marriage. Therefore, all property acquired during a meretricious relationship is presumed to be owned
by both parties. This presumption can be rebutted. All property
considered to be owned by both parties is before the court and is
subject to a just and equitable distribution. The fact title has been
does not, in itself, rebut the
taken in the name of one of the parties
3 13
presumption of common ownership.

The Court also recognized that property owned by one of the
parties before the relationship began and property acquired thereafter by gift, bequest, devise, or descent, or with the rents, issues,
and profits thereof, is not before the court for division. 31 4 These
categories are property which would have been the party's separate property if a marriage had existed.
Subsequent cases have fine-tuned the Connell rule. In
Lindeman v. Lindeman,31 5 a new business was treated as community property. The man had just begun the business when the relationship started, but the business increased in value during the
ten-year relationship.3 1 6 The court stated that the value increase

310. Connell v. Francisco, 898 P.2d 831, 836 (Wash. 1995).
311. Connell v. Francisco, 898 P.2d 831 (Wash. 1995).
312. Id. at 835-36.
313. Id. at 836 (internal citations omitted).
314. Id.
315. Lindeman v.Lindeman, 960 P.2d 966 (Wash. App. Div. 1 1998).
316. Id. at 970, 971.
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"was community in character because it had been achieved by
3 17
[his] community labor."
3 18
In the consolidated cases in In re Marriageof Pennington,
the Washington Supreme Court found that the facts did not satisfy the five factors required to establish a protectable meretricious relationship. 3 19 The relationships involved were sporadic in
nature and accompanied by sexual relationships with third persons, and in one case the woman was still married to another man
3 20
during the alleged meretricious relationship.
32
The Washington Court of Appeals held in Olver v. Fowler 1
(Olver I) that upon the death of one unmarried cohabitant in a
committed relationship, any property acquired during the relationship that would have been community property if the parties
were married is jointly owned and subject to a just and equitable
division. 32 2 This is true even though a meretricious partner does
3 23
not take under the intestacy statutes.
In the subsequent case of Olver v. Fowler3 24 (Olver 11), the
Washington Supreme Court en banc reaffirmed a 2001 opinion
holding that the Connell doctrine applies to same-sex relationships. 32 5 It further held that if both of the same-sex partners are
deceased, their jointly acquired property can be equitably divided
32 6
between their respective estates.
It is not clear that a Montana court would be required to
honor Washington's Connell doctrine. It does not make the property accumulations of unmarried cohabitants community property; it only treats such accumulations as if they were community
property. It may well be that the Washington model has much to
recommend it, and that its Connell doctrine may be adopted in
many other states. Nevertheless, a Montana court may elect to
apply its own public policy in such situations. The Montana Supreme Court apparently has not yet directly ruled on how to divide the property of unmarried cohabitants when their relation317. Id. at 973 (drawing very little distinction between married couples and unmarried
cohabitants in its use of "community property" language).
318. In re Marriageof Pennington, 14 P.3d 764 (Wash. 2000).
319. Id. at 772-73.
320. Id. at 771-72.
321. Olver v. Fowler, 126 P.3d 69 (Wash. App. Div. 1 2006).
322. Id. at 76.
323. Id. at 74.
324. Olver v. Fowler, 168 P.3d 348 (Wash. 2007).
325. Id. at 355, 357.
326. Id. at 356-57.
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ship terminates. Both reported cases that tangentially dealt with
the issue 32 7 did not squarely present the question. In both instances, the parties had ultimately married, thus bringing themselves within the statute, which requires an equitable apportion328
ment upon dissolution of marriage.
C.

ConstitutionalIssues in NontraditionalRelationships

Nontraditional relationships, both between cohabitants of opposite sexes and between same-sex partners, are rapidly proliferating across the country. There is, so far, little uniformity in the
way various jurisdictions treat the property aspects of these relationships upon termination. However, when the constitutional
doctrines discussed above are applied, it is this author's view that
the Montana courts would probably feel obligated to respect the
California law, which makes the property of registered domestic
partners community property. This should follow not only the due
process requirements of the California cases discussed supra, but
also the effect of the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution. 3 29 As Professor Weintraub notes in his Conflict of Laws
treatise:
The Full Faith and Credit Clause articulates one respect in which
national uniformity is required: one state is not free to ignore the
public acts, records, or judicial proceedings of another, not to subject
them to the gantlet [sic] of local "public policy", as it may the acts,
records, and judicial proceedings of a sovereign with which it is not
combined in a federation. In order to determine whether the Full
Faith and Credit Clause places a further limitation on a state's
choice of law than is imposed by the Due Process Clause, the interest of the state that makes application of its law consistent with due
process is to be weighed against the need for national uniformity of
result under a public act, record, or judicial proceeding of a sister
33 0
state.

In a landmark case argued on March 4, 2008,331 the California Supreme Court considered the constitutional nature of Cali327. In re Marriageof Rolf, 16 P.3d 345 (Mont. 2000); In re Marriage of Clark, 71 P.3d
1228 (Mont. 2003).
328. Rolf, 16 P.3d at 348; Clark, 71 P.3d at 1230; Mont. Code Ann. § 40-4-202 (2007).
329. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1.
330. Russell J. Weintraub, Commentary on the Conflict of Laws 666, 666 n. 217 (5th ed.,
West 2006) (citing Justice Stone's language in Milwaukee Co. v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S.
268, 276-77 (1935)).
331. In re Marriage Cases, - P.3d __, 2008 WL 2051892 (Cal. May 15, 2008); Jud.
Council of Cal., Supreme Court to Hear Oral Arguments in Marriage Cases on March 4,
2008, http'//www.courtinfo.ca.gov/presscenter/newsreleases/NR05-08.pdf (Feb. 6, 2008); see
infra nn. 339-55 and accompanying text for explanation of decision.
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fornia statutes which have long defined marriage as a contract between a man and a woman. 3 32 The issue was focused even more
clearly by a 2000 voter-enacted initiative, which provided: "Only
marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in
3 33
California."
The federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) pushes the envelope somewhat further by specifying, in substance, that no state
shall be required to give effect to any law or judicial proceeding in
another state "respecting a relationship between persons of the
same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such
other state."33 4 One commentator suggests that this statute is a
"doubtful attempt to restrict the effect of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause." 3 35 Another provision of DOMA specifies that "the word
'marriage' means only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word 'spouse' refers only to a
336
person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife."
In Smelt v. County of Orange,337 two men who sought to be
married in California challenged both the California voter-enacted
statute 338 and DOMA as violations of the right to privacy, the
Ninth Amendment, the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the Due
Process Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that no state had determined that
they were married, though their situation might change were they
to change their residence to Massachusetts 3 39 (which recognizes
same-sex marriages). The court upheld the federal district court's
abstention regarding the state statutes, noting that the In re Marriage Cases3 40 were then pending in the California appellate
courts, 34 1 and held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge
DOMA. 34 2 The U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari. 3 4 3
This was the backdrop against which the California Supreme
Court heard the Marriage Cases, four consolidated cases filed by
nearly two dozen gay and lesbian couples and by the City and
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.

Cal. Fain. Code Ann. §§ 300, 302 (West 2004 & Supp. 2008).
Id. at § 308.5.
28 U.S.C. § 1738(c) (2000).
Weintraub, supra n. 330, at 682 n. 283.
1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006).
Smelt v. Co. of Orange, 447 F.3d 673 (9th Cir. 2006).
Cal. Fain. Code Ann. § 308.5.
Smelt, 447 F.3d at 677, 683.
In re MarriageCases, __ P.3d __, 2008 WL 2051892 at *57 (Cal. May 15, 2008).
Smelt, 447 F.3d at 681.
Id. at 683.
Smelt v.Orange Co., Cal., 127 S. Ct. 396 (2006).
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County of San Francisco. The issues presented are currently such
hot potatoes that forty-five amicus briefs were filed, and the Court
allowed an unprecedented three and one-half hours of oral argument. The following excerpts from the California Bar Journal's
April 2008 issue illustrate the scope of the issues considered:
Forty-five amicus briefs were filed in response to the challenge
by gay couples and the City and County of San Francisco to the
state prohibition on same-sex marriages, arguing everything from
the necessity to take into account a transformed culture to California's role as a bellwether state to the absence of standing by San
Francisco to file suit at all.
The briefs came from prominent legal scholars, legislators, civil
rights and gay rights organizations, city and county governments,
churches, bar associations and a former state Supreme Court justice. Of the 45 briefs, 29 supported gay marriage, 14 opposed it and
one took no position but admonished the court not to base its decision on popular sentiment.
One group of law professors wrote of the interstate confusion and
problems created when a marriage recognized in one state is not
recognized in another....
But most of the other briefs touched on the larger issues highlighted by the justices: whether same-sex marriage amounts to a
fundamental right and whether the state has to meet a higher standard to deny that right; whether marriage and domestic partnerships are comparable; whether the courts or legislative process
should decide gay marriage; whether tradition is a good enough reason to maintain the current definition of marriage; whether a court
decision 60 years ago to lift the ban on interracial marriage corresponds to the marriage right being sought by gays and lesbians and
whether the ban on same-sex marriage amounts to gender discrimination.
Former Stanford Law School Dean Kathleen Sullivan, arguing
for 17 constitutional law professors, countered the state's prime argument that tradition demands the continued definition of marriage
as that between a man and a woman. Using that argument, Sullivan wrote, courts would not have desegregated schools or opened
doors to women. "Across a wide range of issues . .. constitutional

interpretation has taken into account changed social circumstances
and cultural understandings," she wrote.
Others spoke to the issue of the justification-or not-for gay
marriage when domestic partnerships are a fact of life in California

In a different brief, Pepperdine University School of Law's
Douglas Kmiec and five other law professors supporting marriage
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as it currently stands denied that refusing to allow gays and lesbians to marry amounts to sex discrimination. "As the overwhelming
majority of courts have held over the past decade... marriage laws
do not distinguish on the basis of sex, but rather treat men and women equally."
As for the judiciary's role in deciding gay marriage, which was a
topic of concern for several justices, friends-of-the-court briefs divided on the lines of those who favor gay marriage and those who
don't. "The judiciary should not innovate social policy," wrote
Washington-based Judicial Watch Inc. "Statutes are presumed constitutional and must not be annulled unless the constitutional con3 44
flict is clear, positive and unquestionable."

Only rarely have so many diverse positions been presented to the

highest court of a state.
On May 15, 2008, in a massive 121-page opinion, Chief Justice George held that California Family Code §§ 300 and 308.5,
which together prohibited same-sex couples from marrying in California, violated the California Constitution. 3 45 The Court found
the statutes violated three separate provisions of the California
Constitution, being: (1) the privacy clause, which the Court interpreted as guaranteeing the right to marry the person of one's
choice; 34 6 (2) the liberty interest protected by the due process
3 48
clause; 347 and (3) the equal protection clause.
With respect to the first two points, the Court stated:
[S]ections 1 and 7 of article I of the California Constitution cannot
properly be interpreted to withhold from gay individuals the same
basic civil right of personal autonomy and liberty (including the
right to establish, with the person of one's choice, an officially recognized and sanctioned family) that the California Constitution affords to heterosexual individuals. The privacy and due process provisions of our state Constitution-in declaring that "[aill people...
have [the] inalienable right [of] privacy (art. I, § 1) and that no person may be deprived of "liberty" without due process of law (art. I,
§ 7)-do not purport to reserve to persons of a particular sexual orientation the substantive protection afforded by these provisions. In
light of the evolution of our state's understanding concerning the
equal dignity and respect to which all persons are entitled without
344. Diane Curtis, No Shortage of Advice on Same Sex MarriageCase, Cal. St. B.J. 1, 7
(Apr. 2008).
345. Marriage Cases, __ P.3d __, 2008 WL 2051892 at *57.
346. Cal. Const. art. I, § 1; Marriage Cases, __ P.3d __, 2008 WL 2051892 at *26, 32,
34.
347. Cal. Const. art. I, § 7; Marriage Cases,
P.3d
, 2008 WL 2051892 at *26, 32,
34.
348. Cal. Const. art. I, § 7; Marriage Cases, __ P.3d __, 2008 WL 2051892 at *57.
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regard to their sexual orientation, it is not appropriate to interpret
these provisions in a way that, as a practical matter, excludes 3gay
49
individuals from the protective reach of such basic civil rights.

In its equal protection analysis, the Court concluded:
[S]exual orientation should be viewed as a suspect classificationfor
purposes of the California Constitution's equal protection clause
and... statutes that treat persons differently because of their sexbe subject to strict scrutiny under this constiual orientation should
3 50
tutional provision.

The Court held that:
[R] etention of the traditional definition of marriage does not constitute a state interest sufficiently compelling, under the strict scruwithholding that [martiny equal protection standard, to justify
351
riage] status from same-sex couples.

In reaching its conclusion, the Court relied heavily 3 52 on its
1948 decision in Perez v. Sharp,3 53 which held unconstitutional a
California statute prohibiting interracial marriage. 3 5 4 The Court
observed that Perez was decided twenty years before the U.S. Supreme Court reached the same conclusion under the federal Con35 5
stitution in Loving v. Virginia.
Justice Baxter dissented on the ground that the majority
opinion violates the separation of powers doctrine. 3 56 This dissent
also noted that the high court of Massachusetts is the only other
American court to have ruled that its state constitution gives the
right of civil marriage to same-sex partners, whereas eight other
states (Maryland, New York, Washington, Indiana, Arizona, Minnesota, New Jersey, and Vermont) and the District of Columbia
have rejected claims of state constitutional rights to same-sex
marriages. 3 57 The majority opinion recognized that the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts reached its opinion "by a closely
P.3d __, 2008 WL 2051892 at *34 (emphasis added).
349. Marriage Cases, 350. Id. at *45 (emphasis added).
351. Id. at *57.
352. Id. at *8, 27, 28, 32, 55 n. 71 (citingPerez v. Sharp, 32 Cal. 2d 711 (Cal. 1948)). The
court noted that the Perez opinion emphasized the importance of an individual's freedom
to join in a marriage with the person of one's choice." Id. at *27 (quoting Perez, 32 Cal. 2d
at 715 (emphasis added)).
353. Perez v. Sharp, 32 Cal. 2d 711 (Cal. 1948) (named in other opinions as Perez v.
Lippold, 198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948)).
354. Perez, 32 Cal. 2d at 731-32.
355. Marriage Cases, - P.3d __, 2008 WL 2051892 at *55 n. 71; Loving v. Va., 388
U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
356. Id. at *61 (Baxter, J., dissenting).
357. Id. at *62 n. 4.
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divided (four-to-three) vote" and that the same issue is now before
3 58
the Connecticut Supreme Court.
The California Supreme Court's decision in the Marriage
Cases seems to reflect an acknowledgment of the prevalence of
same-sex unions. The Court noted that many persons and couples
prefer to "live their lives without the formal, officially recognized
and sanctioned, long-term legal commitment to another person
signified by marriage." 35 9 The Court also commented that the
2000 Census reflected that at that time "same-sex couples in California were raising more than 70,000 children." 3 60 One newspaper reported that according to the California secretary of state,
the November 4 ballot will include an initiative to define marriage
as "a union 'between a man and a woman.' " If passed, the initiative would overturn the California Supreme Court's In re Marriage Cases holding that legalized same-sex marriage in the
36 1
state.
The California opinion will certainly not settle the issue in
this hotly disputed area of the law. However, historically the California Court has been at the cutting edge of new developments,
and its decisions often presage positions taken by other courts
much later.3 6 2 The heavily detailed analysis of precedents contained in this opinion will also make it hard to ignore.
VII.

PREMARITAL AGREEMENTS

The character of property that has been designated separate
property under a prenuptial agreement is ordinarily honored if
the circumstances under which the agreement was made satisfy
the governing statute. The Uniform Premarital Agreement Act
has been adopted in both Montana and California, as well as in
twenty-four other states, with small variations from state to
state.3 63 The Act's enforcement provisions require that the premarital agreement be executed voluntarily, that it not be unconscionable, and that each party provide to the other a fair and rea358. Id. at *6 n. 3 (majority).
359. Id. at *31.
360. Id. at *38 n. 50.
361. Cathy Lynn Grossman, Most Say Gay MarriagePrivate Choice; CaliforniaInitiative Puts Spotlight on Voters' Atittudes, USA Today 7D (June 4, 2008).
2008 WL 2051892 at *55 (referring to the Perez and
362. Marriage Cases,__ P.3d -,
Loving opinions).
363. See The Montana Uniform Premarital Agreement Act, Mont. Code Ann. §§ 40-2-601
to -610 (2007); see also Wilkes v. Wilkes, 27 P.3d 433 (Mont. 2001) (interpreting the Uniform
Premarital Agreement Act and Mont. Code Ann. § 72-2-224).
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sonable disclosure of his or her property or financial obligations. 3 6 4 Subsection 2 of this statute gives a court the power to
decline enforcement of a provision that eliminates spousal sup3 65
port.
In California, under long-standing custom, the parties to a
premarital agreement may properly agree that each spouse's postmarriage earnings will continue to be the separate property of the
earning party. But the California version of the Uniform Act provides, in substance, that a waiver of support is not enforceable if
the party against whom the support waiver is sought to be enforced was not represented by independent counsel at the time of
the agreement or if the support waiver provision is unconscionable. 36 6 Some attorneys have suggested that a prenuptial agreement that is signed immediately before the wedding is suspected
to have been coerced or the subject of duress. The current statute
requires that the party against whom enforcement is sought must
have had at least seven calendar days between the time the proposed agreement was first .presented and the time the agreement
was signed to retain independent legal counsel. 3 67 The party must
have also been advised to seek independent counsel. 368 This
agreement must not be executed under duress, 36 9 it must not be
unconscionable, 370 and it must make a full disclosure of assets and
liabilities. 37 1 It is therefore highly desirable to have any prenuptial agreement executed well in advance of a wedding, to have
both parties' respective property disclosures and financial statements attached, and to be sure that both parties are represented
by independent counsel.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

The constitutional requirements discussed above and the Uniform Disposition of Community Property Rights at Death Act combine to create a trap for the unwary Montana practitioner. The
effects are pervasive. They are not limited to family law proceedings, but also extend to estate planning, probate, the preparation
364.
365.
366.
367.
368.
369.
370.
371.

Mont. Code Ann. § 40-2-608.
Id.
Cal. Farn. Code Ann. § 1612(c) (West 2004 & Supp. 2008); see also id. at § 1615.
Id. at § 1615(c)(1).
Id. at § 1615(c).
Id. at § 1615(c)(4).
Id. at § 1615(a)(2).
Id. at § 1615(a)(2)(A).
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of federal estate tax returns, and transactions in real and personal
property whenever any of the funds or assets involved belong to a
couple who formerly lived in a community property state. As long
as any of the funds or property is traceable to a community property asset, that property is still community property, notwithstanding that record title is held in Montana in some other form,
unless there has been a transmutation of the community property
interest. A community property asset does not lose its community
character merely because it is removed to and reinvested in a noncommunity property state.
When an asset is community property, then upon the passing
of the first spouse, the entire property, including the half interest
belonging to the survivor, gets a new "step-up" (or "step-down") in
the cost basis, to its value at the date of death of the first spouse to
die. Thus, both halves of the community asset escape the capital
gains tax, which (assuming the requisite holding period) would
otherwise apply on sale of the asset. If, for example, the property
is traceable to real estate which was originally acquired in California twenty or thirty years earlier, and the existing property is the
result of multiple I.R.C. § 1031 exchanges, any previously unrecognized gain may be very substantial. Thus, failure to appreciate
that an asset is really still community property can result in the
loss of a very sizeable income tax benefit.
The problem is complicated by the fact that: (1) California recognizes acquisitions by "registered domestic partners," including
same-sex partners, to be community property; and (2) its highest
court has just invalidated, in the Marriage Cases, the California
statutes that limited marriage to a contract between a man and a
woman. It is therefore suggested that when a Montana attorney
is dealing with a couple who formerly resided in a community
property state, 37 2 the attorney should take the following steps:
1. Determine from the clients what property they currently own
that has its source in community property on which the appreciation gain has not yet been taxed. (If the predecessor property has
been sold outright, the gain would of course have been currently
taxed at the time of sale. But if the predecessor property was disposed of in one or more tax-deferred exchanges under I.R.C.
§ 1031, the income tax basis of the initially owned property will
372. Community property states include: California, Nevada, Arizona, New Mexico,
Texas, Louisiana, Washington, Idaho, Wisconsin, and (electively) Alaska. Mennell &
Boykoff, supra n. 9, at 1; Alaska Stat. § 34.77.030 (Lexis 2008).
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have been carried forward to the currently owned replacement
property, and no capital gains tax will have been incurred).
2. Determine from clients whether they wish to preserve the
community property character of their present community-source
property. In making this decision, clients should consider the potentially substantial income tax benefit to the survivor if the community property character is preserved, since both halves of a
community property asset get a "stepped-up" (or "stepped-down")
income tax basis to its fair market value at the date of death of the
first spouse to die (or at the alternate valuation date if the estate
qualifies and an alternate valuation date is elected).
3. Determine what the community property provisions are in the
particular community property state in which the clients were formerly domiciled. This is particularly important if the clients came
from California or from some other community property state that
adopted the transmutation rules, 3 73 because those states restrict
the manner in which community property can be changed to separate (individually owned) property.
4. Irrespective of whether the clients do or do not wish to preserve the community property character of a community-source
asset, the attorney should immediately document the clients' decision. It is much easier to do that while both are still living, getting
along with each other, and mentally competent. The documentation should be in one of the following two categories:
a. If the clients wish to preserve the community character of
the asset, the attorney should draft and have executed a Community Property Agreement. Such an Agreement simply recites the community property history of the asset and states
the parties' agreement that it will continue to be community
property, notwithstanding that it has been retitled of record
in some other form (e.g., tenancy in common) since one cannot
take title in community property form in Montana. For example, the Agreement might state (after a recital of the history of
the property) that all of the property listed in Section X shall
continue to be community property under the laws of the
named state in which the clients were formerly domiciled, the
property listed in Section Y shall be the individual (i.e., separate) property of the husband, and the property listed in Section Z shall be the individual property of the wife. Of course,
property owned by each before marriage or acquired after
373. See supra pt. IV.B.7.
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marriage by gift or inheritance is normally the separate property of the acquiring spouse. The Internal Revenue Service
has historically honored Community Property Agreements.
b. If the clients do not want to preserve the asset's community property character, that should also be documented, paying special attention to the transmutation rules that require
the transmutation: (1) be in writing; (2) be signed by each
spouse and preferably acknowledged before a notary; and (3)
recite the specific intention of the party who is relinquishing a
community property interest to change that interest into separate (i.e., individually owned) property.
5. Agreements of either kind should of course contain the legal
description of any real property and should specifically describe
any personal property involved, since the Uniform Disposition of
Community Property on Death Act 3 74 also covers a wide range of
personal property.
In order to provide competent and professional representation
in the areas addressed by this article, the Montana practitioner
must ensure that his or her clients' community property is properly identified and preserved. The practitioner can accomplish
this by understanding the effect of community-source property in
Montana, explaining to clients the potential benefits or consequences of preserving the character of their community-source
property, and taking the necessary steps, including but not limited to those described above, to protect the clients' best interests
with regard to their community-source property.

374. Mont. Code Ann. § 72-9-101 to -120 (2007).
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